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Executive Summary 
  Basel II replaces Basel I’s implicit capital charge on operational risk with an 
explicit charge.  Certain U.S. banks concentrated in processing-related business lines – 
which have significant operational risk – could thus face an increase in overall minimum 
regulatory capital requirements.  Some have argued that, as a result, these so-called 
“processing banks” would be disadvantaged vis-à-vis competitors not subject to 
regulatory capital requirements for operational risk. 
  This paper evaluates these concerns.  To do so, we first describe the five markets 
where processing banks have concentrated their activities:  securities custody, 
institutional asset management, mutual fund management, private wealth management, 
and general processing.  Second, we investigate whether the major competitors in each 
market are expected to be subject to regulatory capital requirements for operational risk.  
Third, we consider whether the processing banks would actually need to raise capital to 
accommodate the new operational risk charge.   
                                                           
* The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston or the Federal Reserve Board.   
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The information we gather suggests that processing banks are well positioned for 
the introduction of an explicit operational risk charge.  In global custody, almost all 
competitors are banks that are expected to adopt Basel II.  The likelihood that the 
operational risk charge would have a competitive impact on the processing banks in this 
business line thus appears small.   
In institutional asset management, the main competitors who will not be subject to 
a regulatory charge for operational risk are firms that specialize in asset management and 
are not part of a bank holding company or other financial conglomerate structure.  These 
“stand-alone” asset managers’ high equity-to-assets ratios suggest that the market already 
requires them to hold capital sufficient to cover their operational risk exposures.  The 
asset management affiliates of two European insurance groups also rank among the top 
institutional asset managers.  However, both of these insurance groups already 
incorporate operational risk in their internal risk-based capital calculations.  
The processing banks do not have a dominant presence in the mutual fund market.  
Only one processing bank ranks among the top thirty U.S. mutual fund providers, and 
that bank is expected not to be required to adopt Basel II.  Thus, it would seem that the 
new operational risk charge is not a significant competitive issue in this business line. 
In any case, the main competitors in mutual fund management who would not be subject 
to an operational risk charge are stand-alone asset managers, who appear highly 
capitalized and might not need to raise additional capital even if subject to Basel II. 
Three processing banks rank among the top U.S. private wealth managers.  They 
face competition in this market from investment banks, large U.S. banks, and foreign 
banks, all of which are expected to face regulatory capital requirements for operational 
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risk.  Smaller U.S. banks that will not be required to adopt Basel II – and will thus not be 
subject to an explicit capital charge for operational risk – are also active in this market.  
However, these banks would remain subject to Basel I’s implicit operational risk charge, 
and are expected to face higher overall minimum regulatory capital requirements than if 
they were to opt in to Basel II. 
  In general processing, competitors include many other financial firms that are 
expected to face a regulatory capital requirement for operational risk.  Processing banks 
also face potential competition from firms that are not subject to capital regulation.  
However, these non-financial competitors tend to be highly capitalized – as evidenced by 
their high equity-to-assets ratios – and do not have the benefits from the federal safety net 
that banks enjoy.  Although they are not subject to any regulatory capital requirement, 
these firms appear to be subject to a market-determined capital requirement to cover all 
of their risks including operational risk.  Thus, the playing field in general processing 
appears level in the sense that banks will be held by the regulators to certain capital 
standards under Basel II, and non-banks will be held to similar or higher standards by the 
market.  The competitive impact of the operational risk capital charge in the processing 
business line could be blunted further by the fact that many processing services are 
bundled with custody services, a business line where almost all of the major providers are 
banks that are expected also to face an operational risk charge. 
  We next consider the relationship among minimum regulatory capital 
requirements and other capital measures at the processing banks to evaluate whether an 
increase in regulatory capital requirements might force these banks to raise additional 
capital.  We address two questions in this regard: whether the processing banks are 
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currently holding capital in excess of minimum regulatory requirements, and whether 
they are doing so because they are already being required by the market to hold sufficient 
capital to cover their operational risks.  If the market currently demands a significant 
capital “buffer” over current minimum regulatory requirements that do not include an 
explicit operational risk capital charge, it is unlikely that Basel II would require the bank 
to raise additional capital.   
  We find that the U.S. processing banks hold a significant amount of capital in 
excess of current regulatory minima.  The results are suggestive that the processing banks 
would be able to align regulatory capital with levels suggested by their internal models 
without raising additional capital.  In fact, the amount of capital actually held by 
processing banks – either because of market or rating agencies’ demands or because of 
their own internal risk evaluations – suggests that these institutions may already be 
holding capital for operational risk.      
  These arguments and evidence suggest that the potential competitive effects of the 
Basel II operational risk charge will be, at most, modest.  The processing banks hold 
considerable capital in excess of the regulatory minima under Basel I, suggesting that 
they are already covering their operational risks in order to satisfy market/rating agency 
demands.  Furthermore, many of the processing banks’ competitors are banks and other 
firms who will likely face a regulatory charge for operational risk.  Although the 
processing banks also compete against firms that will not face an explicit operational risk 
charge, the market appears to require these latter firms to hold sufficient capital to cover 
their operational risk exposure. 
  iv 
  This having been said, the operational risk charge under Basel II could still reduce 
the buffer between actual capital held and minimum regulatory requirements to levels 
below what is desired by management for financial flexibility.  If, as a result, processing 
banks raised additional capital, their costs could rise, adversely impacting their competi-
tive position.  Although our analysis of capital ratios suggests that U.S. processing banks 
are most likely to be able to accommodate the new charge for operational risk without 
increasing total actual capital levels, the analysis is not definitive.  If the processing 
banks’ total actual capital held does increase due to Basel II, and the non-banks’ total 
actual capital held is unchanged, processing banks could face reduced profits or market 
share.  
  However, this possibility should be viewed in perspective.  Although the minimal 
leverage (i.e., high equity-to-assets ratios) displayed by non-banks does not eliminate the 
potential for a competitive impact on banks, it does affect the interpretation of this 
possible impact.  As none of the non-banks has access either to the federal safety net 
provided to banks or faces any regulatory capital requirements, their relatively high 
equity-to-assets ratios could be considered a proxy for the capital the market requires for 
asset management and processing activities.  Thus, even if the operational risk charge 
leads to an increase in total actual capital held by processing banks, it appears that the 
new requirements would still be less than the amount of capital held by prudently-run 
asset management and processing firms that do not have access to the benefits of the 
federal bank safety net.  
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This paper considers the potential competitive impact of the Basel II capital charge for 
operational risk.  Some have expressed concerns that this new charge could lead to an 
increase in total minimum regulatory capital for U.S. processing banks, as they face more 
operational risk relative to credit risk than most other banking organizations.  In this case, 
some believe that processing banks could be placed at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-
vis some of their competitors who do not face a similar charge for operational risk.  To 
address these concerns, we consider the processing banks’ main business activities:  
custody, general processing, and asset management.  We find that in custody, the main 
competitors are banks, almost all of which are expected to face an operational risk charge 
under Basel II.  In processing, many non-bank competitors display a minimal degree of 
financial leverage, and thus appear to have higher capital levels than the processing banks 
would be required to have under Basel II.  In asset management, many competitors are 
expected to face Basel II-based capital charges for operational risk, or already have much 
higher capital ratios than the processing banks.  We also note that the U.S. processing 
banks generally hold significant capital buffers in excess of regulatory capital 
requirements, so that any increase in minimum regulatory capital may not necessarily 
lead to an increase in actual total capital held.  Overall, the information we present 
suggests that the competitive effects of the Basel II operational risk charge will be, at 
most, extremely modest.   
                                                           
* The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston or the Federal Reserve Board.  The authors thank Linda Barriga, Robert Crepinsek, Kimberly 
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Perry, Michael Ravid, Ricki Sears, and Maureen Tighe for their significant contributions.  We also thank 
Roger Cole, Steven Durfey, Edward Ettin, Diana Hancock, Erik Heitfield, Daryl Hendricks, Beverly Hirtle, 
David Jones, Myron Kwast, Michael Macchiaroli, Eugene Morris, Mark O’Dell, Mark Schittig, Amrit 
Sekhon, and Mitch Stengel for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 1.  Introduction 
  Over the past decade, financial institutions have been developing statistical 
models to assess their overall risk profile, and to ensure that capital is sufficient to cover 
unexpected losses.  Such models, generally referred to as economic capital models, have 
many applications.  In addition to serving as risk management and measurement tools, 
economic capital models are used to guide investment decisions and determine executive 
compensation.   
  As financial institutions have increased the sophistication of their economic 
capital models, they have also expanded the range of risks they attempt to measure.  One 
area where significant progress is being made in this regard is the measurement of 
operational risk.  Traditionally, operational risk exposure was either measured in an ad 
hoc manner (e.g., as a fixed percent of revenues) or was not measured at all.  Many banks 
have now incorporated operational risk in their economic capital models, and are using 
the models’ output to allocate operational risk capital across the organization.  Some are 
even publicly disclosing estimates of their aggregate operational risk exposure, together 
with the capital that they hold for operational risk.  
  As banks have developed improved economic capital models, regulators have 
undertaken a concerted effort to incorporate the improvements into regulatory capital 
requirements.    The intent is to use the principles of economic capital to better align 
minimum regulatory capital requirements with banks’ actual risk exposures.  As part of 
this effort to leverage banks’ progress in economic capital modeling, Basel II, the current 
  1proposal to revise the capital regulations for depository institutions, introduces an explicit 
minimum regulatory capital charge for operational risk.
1  
  Some banks have voiced support for an operational risk capital charge based on 
internal models and procedures.  Others have expressed concern that banks concentrating 
on processing-related business lines – which have significant operational risk – could 
face a significant increase in overall minimum regulatory capital.  As banks that have 
chosen to concentrate in processing activities compete against firms not subject to similar 
regulatory requirements, they argue that the new regulatory charge could place the banks 
at a competitive disadvantage.   
  This paper evaluates these concerns.  To do so, we first describe the three markets 
where processing banks have concentrated their activities:  securities custody, asset 
management, and general processing.  Second, we investigate whether the major 
competitors in each market would be subject to an operational risk capital charge under 
the proposed minimum capital requirements.  Third, we examine the relationship among 
other capital measures and minimum regulatory capital requirements at the processing 
banks to evaluate whether an increase in regulatory capital requirements might force 
these banks to raise additional capital. 
 Two  significant  caveats regarding our analysis are in order.  First, sizing the 
charge is complicated by the fact that the U.S. processing banks have not publicly 
                                                           
1 In June 2004, central bank governors and the heads of bank supervisory authorities in the Group of Ten 
(G10) countries issued a press release and endorsed the publication of  “International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework,” the new capital adequacy framework 
commonly known as Basel II.  In the U.S., Basel II will be mandatory only for the largest banks – those 
with more than $250 billion in total assets or $10 billion in international exposure.  Other banks will be 
allowed to opt in, provided that their risk management infrastructure meets the same standards required for 
the mandatory banks.  Banks that do not opt in will remain under the current Basel I-based capital regime.  
Another notable feature of U.S. implementation is that participating banks will be required to adopt the 
advanced methods for determining capital requirements for both credit and operational risk. 
  2disclosed estimates of their operational risk exposure.  Second, detailed and 
comprehensive data regarding these markets and the relevant firms are difficult to come 
by.  Much of our analysis is thus more narrative than empirical, and should be interpreted 
accordingly.   
 The  above  caveats notwithstanding, the information we gather suggests that 
processing banks are well positioned for the introduction of an explicit operational risk 
minimum capital requirement.  In custody services, the most important activity for 
processing banks, all of the main competitors will be subject to capital requirements for 
operational risk.  In processing, in which non-bank competitors are active, many non-
bank competitors display a minimal degree of financial leverage, and thus appear to have 
significantly higher capital levels than the processing banks would be required to have 
under Basel II.  The results are less clear in asset management.  However, many asset 
managers will either also have Basel II-based mandatory operational risk capital charges 
or are much less leveraged than are processing banks.   
  We also find that the U.S. processing banks hold a significant amount of capital in 
excess of current regulatory and supervisory minima.  The results are suggestive that the 
processing banks would be able to align regulatory capital with results from their internal 
models without raising additional capital.  In fact, the amount of capital actually held by 
processing banks – either because of market or rating agencies’ demands or because of 
their own internal risk evaluations – suggests that these institutions may already be 
holding capital for operational risk.      
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 identifies the 
processing banks, and discusses the markets in which they operate.  Section 3 provides a 
  3summary of Basel I and Basel II, as well as other U.S. and E.U. capital requirements 
faced by the processing firms identified in Section 2.  Section 4 considers whether the 
processing banks would need to raise capital to accommodate the new operational risk 
charge.  We consider two questions in this regard: whether the processing banks are 
currently holding a capital buffer over minimum regulatory requirements, and whether 
they are doing so because they are already basing their capital allocation decisions on 
economic capital models or are already being required by the market to hold excess 
regulatory capital to cover their operational risks.  If a bank’s economic capital model 
suggests – or if the market demands – holding a significant capital buffer over current 
minimum regulatory requirements (that do not include an explicit operational risk capital 
charge), it is unlikely that the proposed changes in regulatory requirements would require 
the bank to raise additional capital.  On the other hand, if the reduction in buffer capital 
erodes the processing banks’ flexibility to absorb shocks more than is tolerable to 
management, the new regulations might require processing banks to raise additional 
capital. Section 5 brings together the information from the previous sections to assess 
whether the new capital charge could place the processing banks at a competitive 
disadvantage, and if so relative to what competitors.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Market Identification 
  To examine the potential competitive impact of an operational risk capital 
requirement on U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), we focus on those firms with a 
small volume of credit-related activities relative to their operational activities.  Under 
Basel II, such firms could have a higher percentage of operational risk capital to total 
  4capital than other BHCs, and would likely not receive much of a benefit from reduced 
capital charges for lower-risk credit exposures.  In contrast, U.S. institutions that are 
primarily engaged in lower-risk credit activities are expected to face a lower minimum 
regulatory credit risk (and total) capital charge than is required under current rules. 
  To identify firms focused on operational activities, we select those with a high 
share of income from such activities and a relatively small loan portfolio.  More 
precisely, we select firms with an operational income-to-total income ratio of more than 
50 percent, and a loans-to-assets ratio of less than 50 percent.
2  While these thresholds are 
somewhat arbitrary, examination of Table 1 indicates that they do seem to distinguish 
between traditional commercial banks and those that have chosen to concentrate in 
processing activities.   
  Table 1 lists the top fifty U.S. BHCs, together with the ratio of operational income 
to total income and the ratio of loans to assets for each.  Of the seven institutions meeting 
our selection criteria, we focus on the four domestic banks not primarily engaged in 
brokerage activities:  State Street Corporation (State Street), Mellon Financial 
Corporation (Mellon), Northern Trust Corporation (Northern), and The Bank of New 
York Corporation (BNY).
3  We refer to these four institutions as “the processing banks.” 
  To assess the potential competitive impact of the proposed Basel II operational 
risk capital charge, we first consulted with staff at the processing banks to determine the 
non-credit related business lines in which these firms participate.  We also reviewed 
                                                           
2 Operational income is defined as income from the following sources:  fiduciary activities; investment 
banking, advisory, brokerage, and underwriting; venture capital; servicing; and other non-interest income 
earning activities as defined in the instructions to the form FR Y-9C.  Total income is defined as net 
interest income plus noninterest income.  Insurance underwriting income is excluded from both non-
interest income and total income. 
  5management’s description of business activities contained in annual reports, and 
considered the primary sources of reported non-interest income for each bank.  Based on 
this information, we found that the processing banks are primarily engaged in the 
following three non-credit related businesses lines:  custody, asset management, and 
general processing.   
  We then consulted with knowledgeable industry sources to understand the nature 
and structure of these business lines, and to identify the main competitors in each.  These 
sources included staff at banks, asset managers, and rating agencies, as well as Federal 
Reserve examiners specializing in each of the processing banks.  Table 2 lists the external 
sources with which we held discussions to gather information for this paper.  Our 
findings for each of the three business lines are presented in Sections 2.1-2.3, below. 
 
2.1  Custody 
  Custody is a primary business line for each of the four processing banks.  At its 
most basic level, custody is defined as the business of providing safekeeping and 
settlement for client assets.  Custodians are responsible for holding a broad range of 
financial assets, including equities and bonds on behalf of their clients, and for handling 
the back-office portion (settlement) of a securities trade which involves the exchange of a 
financial instrument for cash.  Typical custody clients include pension and retirement 
funds, asset managers, insurance companies, and banks.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 We do not consider Taunus or CIBC Delaware as they are owned by foreign parents (Deutsche Bank and 
CIBC, respectively).  We do not consider Charles Schwab because they are primarily a securities firm 
rather than a bank. 
  6  Global custody is the business of providing settlement and safekeeping on a cross-
border basis.  Global custody is distinguished from domestic custody in that domestic 
custody relates to financial assets from only one country, while global custody involves 
handling assets and currencies from different countries.  Technically, a custodian could 
be called “global” if it services assets in at least two countries.  However, the major 
global custodians typically cover 100 national markets or more.   
  Tables 3 and 4 list the largest global custodians by assets under custody (AUC), 
the standard size measure in the custody business, as well as some background 
information about the custodians.  A custodian’s size and the breadth of its global 
network are two important factors in determining its success in the global custody 
market, as custody involves significant economies of scale and scope.  Within the group 
listed in Table 3 is a subset of firms that are viewed by the industry as major global 
custodians.  This subset can be identified by the indicators in the table that report which 
companies were included in two industry-recognized surveys of the top providers in the 
custody business (panel b).
4  Table 3 also includes an indicator for the geographic areas 
in which each custodian services clients and a list of the types of clients served.             
  Table 3 indicates that most global custodians are banks.
5  That the only U.S. 
institutions on the list are banking groups may reflect certain features of the infrastructure 
of the U.S. banking system.  Fedwire, the Federal Reserve System’s electronic payment 
processing service, provides custodians with the ability to move funds through the 
                                                           
4 The Buttonwood Survey is an annual survey that provides specific information on companies that 
Buttonwood International, an industry research group, deems to have the size and scale to be significant 
competitors in the global custody market.  The institutions in this survey overlap significantly with those on 
the list of the largest global custodians by assets under custody (AUC).  The Global Investor Magazine 
survey is an annual survey of custody clients that identifies the predominant global custodians and 
measures customer satisfaction with these custodians. 
  7financial system for same day settlement, but an entity must be structured as a bank to 
access Fedwire.  Fedwire also allows custodians to move government securities through 
the financial system with the same rapidity and finality as funds; trades in these securities 
can be settled only on Fedwire or on the books of a depository institution with access to 
Fedwire.  The bank infrastructure also provides U.S. banks with access to the discount 
window, which provides the benefit of an emergency source of liquidity, and thus a 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis non-bank competitors, since the ability to transfer funds 
and securities rapidly and with certainty is highly valued by custodial customers.   
 
2.2  Asset Management 
  Asset management is the process of investing client assets according to specified 
objectives, monitoring such investments, and changing investment allocations as market 
factors change.  Table 5 provides a list of the largest asset managers based on worldwide 
assets under management (AUM) as of 12/31/03.  AUM, the volume of funds invested on 
behalf of clients, is the standard measure of market share in the asset management  
industry.  Table 5 also reports total balance sheet assets, as well as equity-to-assets ratios 
and risk-based capital ratios (panel b).  For insurance companies reported in Table 5 (and 
in all other tables), separate account assets are excluded from both total assets and equity-
to-assets.
6  This is done in order to put these figures on the same basis as those for banks, 
whose assets under management are not included in balance sheet assets. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 Except for SIS Segaintersettle AG which is owned by a group of Swiss banks (including UBS and Credit 
Suisse) and serves as a central securities depository for Switzerland. 
6 In the U.S. and certain other countries, separate account assets are included as offsetting line items in the 
asset and liability portions of insurance companies’ balance sheets. 
  8  As Table 5 shows, the top asset managers include not just banks, but also 
insurance affiliates and non-depository firms specializing in asset management. In 
contrast to the custody function, the ability to access Fedwire or the discount window (or 
more generally being a bank) adds no special advantage (or disadvantage) to the asset 
management function.  As will be seen in Section 3, each of the entity types that conduct 
asset management is subject to different regulatory requirements regarding operational 
risk capital.  This will make the analysis of the operational risk capital charge more 
complex as compared to global custody, where most competitors were banks. 
  Interviews with industry experts, as well as multiple trade publications and data 
sources, suggest that the asset management market can be broken down into three 
submarkets based on the type of client served: institutional asset management, mutual 
fund management, and private wealth management.  The following sections provide an 
overview of each.   
a.  Institutional Asset Management 
  Institutional asset managers provide investment management services, typically in 
the form of separate accounts, to clients such as pension funds, financial institutions, and  
foundations and endowments.  All four processing banks offer institutional asset  
management services to clients on a worldwide basis.  For the purposes of this analysis, 
the institutional market is viewed as a global market, and competition is measured by 
worldwide AUM.  Table 6 lists the fifty largest institutional asset managers by worldwide 
AUM. 
  As shown in Table 6, three of the four processing banks under consideration 
(Mellon, Northern, and State Street) are among the top ten global institutional asset 
  9managers.  (BNY manages $58 billion in institutional assets, ranking 56th among global 
institutional asset managers.)  Several non-banking U.S. firms specializing in asset 
management (Fidelity, Wellington, and Vanguard) also rank among the top ten, as do two 
foreign banks (Barclays and Deutsche Bank).  Rounding out the top ten are several 
affiliates of insurance companies (AIG and Allianz).  The top of the list is dominated by 
firms with large passive management businesses (State Street, Barclays, and Vanguard), 
because there are significant scale economies in this area.
7
  Interviews with industry participants suggested that firms are typically classified 
along multiple dimensions within the institutional asset management market.  Two of the 
most important such dimensions are asset classes offered (e.g., equity, fixed income, 
cash), and types of strategies offered (e.g., active vs. passive, quantitative vs. 
fundamental).
8  To keep the length and complexity of the paper manageable, we did not 
pursue these additional dimensions.  This approach can be considered conservative, as 
segmenting institutional asset management into multiple submarkets would reduce the 
likelihood of any two firms being considered direct competitors. 
b.  Mutual Fund Management 
  A mutual fund pools money from shareholders and invests it in a diversified 
portfolio of securities.  In the U.S., mutual funds are structured as investment companies 
with their own governance structure, and are owned by the fund shareholders.  A fund 
                                                           
7 Passive management refers to the strategy of managing a portfolio to match the return of a benchmark, 
such as a market index.  Active management refers to the strategy of managing a portfolio with the aim of 
exceeding the return on a benchmark.  Scale economies arise in asset management because the number of 
staff required to manage a large pool of assets is not much greater than the number of staff required to 
manage a small pool of assets.  For active strategies, however, these scale economies are offset by the 
difficulty and cost of taking large positions in individual securities, which is necessary if the benchmark is 
to be exceeded. 
  10manager is hired by the mutual fund to manage the investment portfolio in accordance 
with the stated objectives of the fund prospectus.   
  All of the processing banks provide mutual fund management services.
9  As they 
offer mutual funds mostly to U.S. clients, our analysis will focus on the U.S. market.
10  
Table 7 lists the largest mutual fund companies in the U.S.  It is worth noting that due to 
data limitations, the mutual fund assets reported in Table 7 come from both institutional 
and retail investors, so that there is some overlap with the institutional assets considered 
in section 2.2a.
11  However, the firms listed as top competitors in Table 7 all have a 
significant presence in the retail segment of the mutual fund market. 
  The top three U.S. mutual fund companies are firms that specialize in asset 
management and are not part of a bank holding company or other conglomerate structure.  
(We will refer to such firms as “stand-alone asset managers.”)  None of these three firms 
is publicly traded, so there are very limited financial data for them.
12  As with the 
institutional asset management market, banks and insurance affiliates are also 
competitors. 
  The mutual fund market can be segmented along multiple dimensions.  Like 
institutional asset managers, mutual fund managers can be classified by asset classes and 
strategies offered.  However, the mutual fund market could also be segmented by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 A quantitative manager selects his portfolio via mathematical formulae, whereas a fundamental manager 
relies on more traditional “stock picking” techniques. 
9 BNY’s mutual fund assets (approximately $11 billion) were not large enough to place it among the top 50 
firms reported in Table 7. 
10 It is natural to segment the market is this way, as SEC regulations permit only U.S.-registered mutual 
funds to market themselves to customers in the U.S. 
11 Our data on mutual funds are collected from the CRSP mutual fund database. Based on the information 
provided in this database, it is not possible to segregate retail and institutional assets.  In its 2004 Mutual 
Fund Fact Book (p. 138), the Investment Company Institute reports that 46 percent of all mutual fund 
assets were held in institutional accounts as of year-end 2003. 
  11distribution channel.  For example, some mutual fund companies “own” their distribution 
channel; some distribute via commissioned brokers; and some distribute via mutual fund 
“supermarkets.”  Some of the industry experts we interviewed suggested that firms 
operating via different distribution channels would not tend to view themselves as direct 
competitors.  We also believe that the relationship between size and competitiveness is 
quite nuanced in mutual fund management.  On one hand, smaller companies not shown 
on Table 7 can be viable competitors against even the largest firms, especially if they 
have one or two successful niche strategies.  On the other hand, size does offer several 
benefits in this market, as larger firms are typically more well-known, and there may be 
scale economies in mutual fund marketing and distribution.  As with institutional asset 
management, however, we will take the conservative approach of not pursuing more 
granular segmentations of the mutual fund market. 
c.  Private Wealth Management 
  Private wealth managers provide investment management services to wealthy 
individuals and families.  Mellon, Northern, and BNY provide private wealth 
management services and focus this business primarily on U.S. clients.
13  As a result, our 
analysis focuses on companies that compete for U.S. clients.
14  The 40 largest such firms 
as of June 2003 are listed in Table 8.  Northern, Mellon and BNY are ranked 9, 14, and 
24, respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
12 Fidelity and The Capital Group Companies are privately held, and Vanguard is a mutual company 
(owned by the shareholders of its funds). 
13 State Street sold its private wealth management business in 2003 to US Trust. 
14 It is possible that certain wealthy U.S. citizens may seek out a private banker that has no presence in the 
U.S.  However, our interviews with industry participants suggested that a physical presence in the U.S. is 
required to compete in this market, as this is a highly relationship-driven business. 
  12  Merrill Lynch and Citigroup (Smith Barney) dominate this market with $630 
billion and $497 billion in assets under management, respectively.  Fidelity ranks third, 
with $295 billion in AUM.  Most of the other firms listed in Table 8 are banks.  These 
bank competitors include large U.S. banks (e.g., J.P. Morgan Chase), smaller U.S. trust  
companies (Bessemer Trust), and foreign banks (UBS).  The predominance of banks in 
this market may be explained by cross-selling (e.g., banks have other products besides 
asset management that high net worth individuals are interested in) or by marketing (e.g., 
being a bank is a natural advantage in a market where stability and dependability are key  
attributes of any player).  Interestingly, only one processing bank (Northern) ranks among 
the top ten private wealth managers. 
 
2.3  Processing 
  The focus of this paper is on activities undertaken by the processing banks that do 
not involve the extension of credit.  We have already considered the two most important 
such activities, custody and asset management.  In this section, we will define the term 
“processing” to include all other material non-credit business lines undertaken by the 
processing banks.  To identify these business lines, we gathered information from various 
documents (e.g., annual reports, websites) for each processing bank, and confirmed this 
information with resident examiners and with staff at the banks themselves.  The business 
lines we identified via this process are listed in Table 9. 
  There is no comprehensive list of firms engaged in the processing business lines 
listed in Table 9.  We consulted multiple sources to construct such a list.  These include 
Hoovers’ list of major competitors for each processing bank, industry surveys, and 
  13business line overviews published in various trade journals.  We confirmed this 
information and also added a few firms through interviews with examination staff, the 
processing banks, and other industry participants.  The resulting list is limited to the U.S. 
processing market, as that was the focus of most of the data sources we identified.  
Otherwise, the list is probably overly inclusive, in that it includes firms that may not be 
direct competitors of the processing banks.  Table 10 lists all of the processing firms 
identified, as well as the processing activities in which they compete.     
  In recent years, the custody market has become more complex as custodians have 
expanded their service offerings.  It is now typical for global custodians to provide a 
bundled custody product to clients, which includes the provision of one or more of the 
processing services listed in Table 9, along with custody.
15  Banks may enjoy a 
competitive advantage when custody-related activities are bundled with the core custody 
product.  Many clients also prefer to obtain processing services from their custodian, as it 
can be more efficient from both management and cost perspectives.  As indicated in 
Table 9, fifteen of the seventeen processing activities we consider are custody-related.
16
  While custody and related processing services are often purchased as a bundled 
product, there are instances when custody clients choose to obtain one or more of the 
custody-related services in Table 9 from a company other than a global custodian.  Non-
financial technology-oriented companies such as Sungard and BISYS may provide a few  
                                                           
15 See “Custody Clients Demand More,” Global Investor, May 2000, p. 14; “Searching for the Cream: 
Added Value,” Financial Times, 7/14/00, p. 7. 
16 We have identified only two processing activities that are not related to custody: employee benefit plan 
administration, and human resource outsourcing and consulting.  State Street provides benefit plan 
administration primarily in the U.S. through CitiStreet, a joint venture with Citigroup.  Mellon, through 
their Human Resources & Investor Solutions business line, provides human resource services that include 
outsourcing human resource functions and consulting on issues such as employee retention and health care 
costs. 
  14of these services or the technology for a client to perform the service themselves.  
However, such companies do not provide the core custody product or a full range of 
processing services.  They also tend to focus on smaller clients and have a more limited 
geographic scope than the global custodians. 
  At this point, it is unclear to what extent the non-bank entities are directly 
competing with the processing banks to provide processing services.  On one hand, most 
processing activities are closely related to custody, where banks have special advantages.  
On the other hand, customers can purchase processing services separately from non-bank 
providers, and in certain instances have done so.  For the purposes of this paper, we will 
assume that non-banks are fully competitive with banks for the provision of custody-
related services.  This is a conservative assumption, in that it increases the likelihood of 
identifying a potential competitive impact for the operational risk capital charge, since 
non-banks would not be subject directly to Basel II capital requirements. 
 
3.  Capital Regulation Faced by Processing Banks and Their Competitors 
  This section reviews current and future operational risk capital requirements for 
firms competing in the custody, asset management, and processing markets.  We first 
discuss the two Basel Accords, and then focus on U.S. regulatory capital requirements for 
the processing banks and their competitors.  We conclude with a parallel discussion of 
capital requirements for non-U.S. firms.  As almost all of these are domiciled in Europe, 
we focus our attention on the E.U. regulatory environment.  
 
  153.1  The Basel Accords 
  In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued the Basel I 
framework governing capital adequacy for internationally active banks.  The Committee 
sought to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system and 
to foster regulatory consistency across different countries, thereby reducing an existing 
source of competitive inequality.  Basel I set minimum regulatory capital at 8 percent of 
risk-weighted assets, and also specified two tiers of capital.  Tier 1 capital is primarily 
equity capital and retained earnings, and must represent at least 4 percent of risk-
weighted assets.  Tier 2 capital includes such elements as loan loss reserves, hybrid 
capital instruments, and subordinated debt. 
  Basel I incorporated only crude proxies for risk:  the calculation of risk-weighted 
assets captured primarily credit risk based on a simple classification of exposures into 
four buckets.  Banks’ internal economic capital models, being more risk-sensitive than 
Basel I, derived different capital assessments than the regulatory framework.  In general, 
regulatory capital exceeded economic capital for banks’ less risky assets, while economic 
capital exceeded regulatory capital for the more risky assets.  On average, regulatory 
minimum capital was probably exceeded by economic capital at the typical bank.  The 
minimal risk-sensitivity of the Basel I capital weights – with their resultant deviations 
from economic capital estimates – encouraged banks to move safer assets off balance 
sheet through securitizations.  Because of this regulatory arbitrage, regulatory capital 
ratios have become increasingly disconnected from banks’ true financial risk profiles. 
  The new Basel Accord is intended to use the principles of economic capital to 
better align minimum regulatory capital with banks’ actual risk exposures.  Banks will be 
  16expected to have sufficient capital to cover significant but not catastrophic losses.  Basel 
II will require banks to use formal procedures (e.g., internal ratings) to measure credit 
risk, and will require them to hold capital for unexpected losses based on those 
procedures.
17  Another major innovation is the introduction of an explicit capital charge 
for operational risk.   
  Basel II lays out a series of increasingly sophisticated approaches for measuring 
both credit and operational risk.  The most sophisticated are the Advanced Internal 
Ratings Based (AIRB) approach for credit risk, and the Advanced Measurement 
Approach (AMA) for operational risk.
18  The intent of the Basel Committee is to calibrate 
the simpler approaches to yield a higher capital charge than would be expected under the 
advanced approaches, thus encouraging banks to migrate to the AIRB and AMA.  It is 
expected that for many banking organizations using the advanced approaches, the sum of 
the credit and operational risk charges may result in a somewhat lower total minimum 
regulatory capital charge than under Basel I, particularly if the portfolio exposures at the 
particular bank are less risky than average. 
  The Advanced Measurement Approach allows a bank to hold regulatory capital 
for operational risk based on its own internal procedures, provided that these conform to 
a general framework laid out by the regulators.  One key element of this framework is the 
formal definition of operational risk, which is “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate 
                                                           
17 Basel II does not require banks to hold credit risk capital to cover expected losses (EL), provided that 
eligible loan loss reserves meet or exceed EL.  If eligible reserves fall short of EL, Basel II reduces 
measured Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. 
18 The two simpler models for operational risk are the Basic Indicator Approach and the Standardized 
Approach.  Banks using the Basic Indicator Approach must hold capital for operational risk equal to the 
average over the previous three years of a fixed percentage of positive annual gross income.  In the 
Standardized Approach, banks’ activities are divided into eight business lines, and the capital charge for 
each business line is calculated by multiplying gross income by a factor assigned to that business line.  
  17or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events.”  To convey a 
less formal and more intuitive understanding of what operational risk is and why it is  
important, we also consider four causal categories into which operational losses can be 
classified.
19  The first such category is fraud, which includes activities such as rogue 
trading, embezzlement, and theft. The second category consists of lawsuits arising from 
improper business practices; this category is very broad, and the alleged behavior can 
range from anti-competitive practices to false advertising to employee discrimination.  A 
third category covers losses caused by system failures (e.g., computer and 
telecommunications equipment breakdowns) and process failures (e.g., “fat finger” trades 
and model errors).  The final category covers losses arising from physical causes such as 
terrorism, natural disasters, and workplace safety. 
  Banks will also be required to incorporate four major elements into their 
operational risk quantification methodology.  These are: 
•  Internal loss data.  Institutions must collect data on their own operational loss 
history.  The data must cover at least five years, and should cover all loss 
types and all material business lines. 
•  External loss data.  The term “external loss data” refers to data on operational 
losses that have occurred at other financial institutions.  AMA banks are 
required to consider such data as a supplement to internal data for low-
frequency risks to which they are exposed. 
•  Scenario analysis.  Scenario analysis refers to a systematic process for 
obtaining expert opinions regarding the likelihood and potential impact of 
large operational losses.  Like external data, scenario analysis is meant to 
supplement internal data in cases where a bank’s own experience is limited. 
                                                           
19 We have diverged somewhat from the standard Basel loss types for expositional purposes.  The standard 
loss types are: internal fraud; external fraud; employment practices and workplace safety; clients, products, 
and business practices; damage to physical assets; business disruption and system failure; and execution, 
delivery, and process management. 
  18•  Business environment and internal control factors.  Banks are required to 
monitor and measure both the external business environment and the internal 
control environment, and to adjust capital for changes that have not been 
reflected in the other three components of the framework (internal data, 
external data, and scenarios). 
The rules allow banks considerable flexibility in combining these four elements, and 
impose no minimum standards on how much weight should be given to each.  However, 
banks are required to consider each when estimating their Aggregate Loss Distribution 
(ALD), which represents the total losses they may face over a one year period.  Basel II 
requires a bank to hold capital for unexpected losses (UL) from operational risk, where 
UL is defined as the difference between the mean and the 99.9
th percentile of the ALD.
20
  As noted, the expectation is that most banks adopting the AIRB and AMA will 
have a modest reduction in their minimum regulatory capital stemming mostly from the 
treatment of certain low-risk credit exposures.  However, processing banks, by definition, 
have modest credit exposures and relatively high operational risk exposures.  As 
operational risk is not explicitly addressed under Basel I, processing banks might well 
have their minimum regulatory capital increased under Basel II.  However, as we shall 
see, this may not necessarily imply an increase in total capital held. 
 
3.2  The Regulatory Framework for U.S. Financial Institutions 
  This section introduces current and proposed regulatory frameworks for financial 
institutions in the U.S., and seeks to identify which firms discussed in Section 2 would be 
subject to an explicit operational risk capital charge under Basel II. 
                                                           
20 The Basel II Accord states that “to base the minimum regulatory capital requirement on UL alone, the 
bank must be able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of its national supervisor that it has measured and 
accounted for its EL exposure.”  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004, p. 144).  The 
expected loss (EL) exposure is calculated as the mean of the ALD. 
  19a.  The U.S. Implementation of Basel II 
  There are two notable features of the U.S. implementation of Basel II.  First, 
Basel II will be mandatory only for the largest U.S. banks – those with more than $250 
billion in total assets or $10 billion in international exposure.  Other banks will be 
allowed to opt in, provided that their risk management infrastructure meets the same 
standards required for the mandatory banks.  Banks that do not opt in will remain under 
the current Basel I-based capital regime. 
  U.S. banks do not publicly disclose their international exposure, nor have they 
been required to announce their intention to opt in.
21  It is thus difficult for the agency the 
authors represent to identify those U.S. banks that will adopt Basel II.  For these reasons, 
we will refer to a list recently published in the American Banker to identify U.S. banks 
that, in that newspaper’s opinion, will likely adopt Basel II.  (Our use of such a list is 
neither an endorsement nor a statement regarding its accuracy.)  The list is reproduced in 
Table 11.  Three of the so-called processing banks (BNY, Northern, and State Street) are 
expected to adopt Basel II.  The fourth, Mellon, is listed as undeclared. 
  The second notable feature of U.S. implementation is that participating banks will 
be required to adopt the advanced methods for determining capital requirements for both 
credit and operational risk.  It is expected that overall capital will be somewhat lower for 
many banks under the advanced approaches of Basel II than under Basel I, and the 
potential capital reduction provides an incentive to opt in.
22  However, developing the 
                                                           
21 U.S. banks are required to report their material foreign exposures on form FFIEC 009a, which is  
publicly available.  However, full information regarding banks’ aggregate foreign exposure is reported only 
on form FFIEC 009, which is not publicly available. 
22 Industry comments, regulatory reviews, and data collection exercises such as the previous Quantitative 
Impact Studies, all suggest that credit risk capital at a typical bank would decline upon implementation of 
the AIRB approach.  For banks with a high credit risk exposure relative to their operational risk exposure, 
the decline in the credit charge may more than offset the new operational risk charge. 
  20data and models necessary to quantify credit and operational risk requires a sizable fixed 
cost investment.  As the net benefits of capital reduction are variable, it is expected that 
smaller institutions will choose at least initially to forego both costs and benefits and 
remain under the current Basel I-type U.S. regulatory capital rules.   
  It should also be noted that rating agencies recognize the exposure operational 
risk poses and have begun phasing in an assessment of this risk and the associated risk 
management practices in their analyses of bank creditworthiness.  Operational risk 
management practices are becoming an important factor considered for all rated banks 
regardless of the regulatory capital regime to which they are subject (Basel I or Basel 
II).
23
  The remainder of this section will review the regulatory capital requirements 
faced by competitors to processing banks, both banks that are unlikely to be required to 
adopt (or choose to adopt) Basel II and non-banks that operate under entirely  
different capital regimes. Many of the latter firms face regulatory capital charges, some 
specifically for operational risk.  Others do not face regulatory capital charges, but 
nonetheless appear to hold a significant amount of economic capital.   
b.  Mutual Funds 
  SEC regulations do not impose capital requirements on either mutual funds or 
their managers.  However, if a mutual fund manager is part of a Financial Holding 
Company (FHC), the Federal Reserve Board may take into account the manager’s 
activities in assessing the consolidated capital of the FHC.  If the FHC is subject to Basel 
                                                           
23 See Ramadurai, Krishnan et al.  “The Oldest Tale but the Newest Story:  Operational Risk and the 
Evolution of its Measurement under Basel II,” A Special Report by FitchRatings, January 7, 2004; and 
Young and Theodore, “Moody’s Analytical Framework For Operational Risk Management Of Banks,” 
Moody’s Investors Service, January 2003. 
  21II, a mutual fund manager’s operational risk exposure would be reflected in the parent’s 
regulatory capital requirement.  If a mutual fund manager is not part of a FHC subject to 
Basel II, then it will not be subject to an operational risk charge – either directly or 
indirectly via a parent company.   
c.  Asset Management Affiliates of Insurance Companies 
  In the U.S., asset management and processing activities of insurance companies 
conducted outside the legal structure of the insurance company are not subject to any 
insurance regulatory capital charges either directly or indirectly at the consolidated level.  
Not surprisingly, most insurers conduct these activities via subsidiaries held directly 
under the parent company.  In fact, almost all of the insurance-affiliated asset managers 
and processors considered in this paper adopt this capital-efficient (i.e., regulatory capital 
avoiding) legal structure.
24
d.  Investment Banks 
  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has adopted a final rule entitled 
“Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated 
Supervised Entities,” which amends the SEC’s existing net capital rule by establishing a 
voluntary, alternative method of computing certain deductions for net capital purposes for 
certain broker-dealers.  The rule became effective on August 20, 2004.   
  The rule was enacted in part to provide a mechanism for E.U. affiliates of U.S. 
broker-dealers to comply with the E.U.’s Financial Conglomerates Directive (FCD), 
which requires that such affiliates be subject to consolidated group-wide supervision and 
                                                           
24 The one exception is Jackson National Life, which provides fund accounting services within the 
insurance entity.  However, there is no explicit capital charge for operational risk in the U.S. even in the 
case of an asset manager held under an insurance underwriter. 
  22capital requirements in their home country.  For affiliates that are not subject to such 
consolidated supervision, the FCD would require E.U. or European nation “host” 
oversight of the European affiliate or possibly the establishment of an E.U. – or European 
nation “host” – regulated holding company and the restriction of exposures between the 
E.U. sub-group and the worldwide group.  To avoid such non-U.S. regulation, a U.S. 
institution can apply for consolidated group-wide supervision by the SEC, in which case 
it would be referred to as a “Consolidated Supervised Entity” (CSE).
25  Only the largest 
broker-dealers, with tentative net capital of at least $1 billion and net capital of at least 
$500 million, are eligible.  According to SEC staff, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,  
Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns have expressed keen interest in CSE 
status.
26
  The CSE regime allows broker-dealers to calculate net capital deductions for 
market risk with mathematical models that are consistent with the framework of Basel II.  
There would be no explicit charge for operational risk at the broker-dealer level.  
However, the ultimate holding companies of broker-dealers would be required to 
compute capital reflecting market, credit, and operational risks across the entire 
organization, if they elect Basel II at the outset.  Otherwise, a broker-dealer may elect 
Basel I pending formal implementation of Basel II. 
                                                           
25 The Commission in addition adopted rules which create a new framework for allowing the holding 
company of a registered broker-dealer to elect to become a supervised investment bank holding company, 
which would subject it to supervision on a consolidated basis comparable to the supervision envisioned 
under the CSE proposal.  No net capital exemption would be available, but the minimum capital required of 
the broker-dealer would be substantially less than that required of CSE broker-dealers. 
26 See “US SEC clears new net-capital rules for brokerages,” Reuters News, April 28, 2004.  According to 
this newswire story, “Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns 
have expressed keen interest in CSE status, SEC Market Regulation Director Annette Nazareth told 
reporters after the meeting.”  The meeting in question is the open meeting at which the Commission voted 
to approve the Alternative Net Capital Rule. 
  23  The treatment of operational risk under the CSE regime follows Basel II very 
closely.  One significant difference is that the former allows the simpler approaches for 
operational risk capital (as well as the AMA), whereas the latter allows only the AMA.
27  
However, the intent of the Basel Committee is for the simpler approaches to yield higher 
operational risk capital charges than the AMA.  The staff of the SEC have advised that 
they expect that each of the investment banking firms will elect the AMA approach 
eventually, in part to avoid unfavorable comparison with the larger banking institutions. 
 
3.3  European Union Regulatory Capital Requirements for Operational Risk 
  This section reviews current and future operational risk capital requirements for 
the non-U.S. firms identified in Section 2.  As almost all of these non-U.S. firms are 
domiciled in Europe, we focus our attention on the E.U. regulatory environment.
28  
Regulations in other foreign countries are discussed on an as-needed basis throughout the 
paper. 
a.  Banks and Investment Firms 
  The European Union will implement Basel II via a new Capital Adequacy 
Directive, CAD3.  There are two key differences between the proposed E.U. and U.S. 
implementations of Basel II.  First, E.U. implementation will have a wider scope of 
application than U.S. implementation, as CAD3 will apply to all credit institutions and 
investment firms.  Recall that in the U.S., Basel II will be required only for a select group 
                                                           
27 See footnote 18 for a discussion of the simpler approaches. 
28 Several of the firms (e.g., Credit Suisse and UBS) that compete with the processing banks are domiciled 
in Switzerland, which is not part of the E.U..  For the purposes of this paper, however, Swiss implementa-
tion of Basel II is similar to the E.U. implementation.  In particular, banks will have the option of choosing 
one of the simpler approaches to operational risk in addition to the AMA.  It is anticipated that the simpler 
approaches will yield higher operational risk capital charges than the AMA. 
  24of large commercial banks, and will be voluntary for smaller commercial banks (and 
thrifts) as well as large investment banks (under the SEC’s CSE regime).  Second, CAD3 
would allow all banks to apply one of the simpler approaches for determining the capital 
charge for operational risk (in addition to the AMA).
29  In the U.S., the AMA will be the 
only option for quantifying operational risk exposure.  However, as noted, the intent of 
the Basel Committee is for the simpler approaches to yield higher operational risk capital 
charges than the AMA, in which case an E.U. bank or investment firm would face an 
operational risk capital charge that is at least as great as a U.S. bank with a similar risk 
profile.  E.U. implementation of Basel II will begin in 2007 with the simpler approaches 
for both credit and operational risk, with the advanced approaches (including the AMA) 
starting in 2008. 
b.  Supervisory standards in the U.S. and Europe 
  Although all European banks will face a capital charge for operational risk under 
Basel II, it can be argued that the charge will depend as much on supervisory 
implementation in each jurisdiction as it does on the actual regulations.  It is not possible 
to address this argument directly, as the rigor with which various supervisors implement 
the Basel II framework will not be observable until 2008.  However, the argument can be 
addressed indirectly, by observing the actions of the banks and interpreting these as a 
signal on how demanding they expect their supervisors to be.  Specifically, if a bank 
anticipates rigorous supervision of its AMA model, then we would expect it to begin 
work early on a comprehensive modeling approach.   
                                                           
29 See footnote 18 for a discussion of the simpler approaches. 
  25  Table 12 lists all U.S. and European banks exceeding $500 billion in total assets 
as of December 31, 2002, and reports information regarding each institution’s publicly 
stated plans to pursue an AMA.  The table reports whether each bank has already 
published estimates of its operational risk exposure, and whether it is pursuing each of 
the four required AMA elements.  This information was obtained from public sources 
including annual reports, SEC filings, and other official documents, as well as 
presentations that bank staff have made at industry conferences. 
  The three U.S. banks reported in the table appear to have made significant 
progress towards AMA implementation.  Two (Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase) have 
disclosed an operational risk capital estimate.  All three have acquired both internal and 
external loss data, and have also conducted risk self-assessments.  Furthermore, two of 
the three U.S. banks have constructed scenarios to better understand those operational 
risk exposures for which internal and external data are either limited or nonexistent.
30
  The European banks have also made significant progress: all of the European 
institutions reviewed have begun collecting internal loss data, 13 of 15 have acquired 
external loss data, 10 have incorporated self-assessment results in their capital model, and 
6 have incorporated scenario analysis.  Of course, it is difficult to conclude based on 
public information whether U.S. or European banks are more advanced in AMA 
implementation.  Based on their substantial progress in this regard, however, it would 
appear that banks in both the E.U. and the U.S. are expecting rigorous supervision of the 
AMA standards. 
  To address potential differences in supervisory approaches within G-10 countries 
and outside the G-10 countries, the Basel Committee created the Accord Implementation 
  26Group (AIG).  The aim of the AIG is to promote consistency in the application of the 
Accord through the sharing of plans, experiences, ideas, and approaches.  Additional 
assurance that foreign banks will be held to the same standards as U.S. banks is derived 
from the disclosure requirements under Basel II, which will provide investors, clients, 
and regulators access to details regarding an institution’s application of the advanced 
approaches. 
c.  Affiliates of E.U. Insurance Companies 
  In the E.U. as in the U.S., asset management and processing activities of 
insurance conglomerates conducted outside of the legal structure of an insurance 
company are not subject to any insurance regulatory capital charges.
31  Like their U.S. 
counterparts, the insurance-affiliated asset managers we considered (Allianz, AXA, and 
Generali) have chosen a regulatory capital-avoidance structure where these entities are 
held directly under the parent holding company.    
  Beginning in 2005, insurance entities with other financial services holdings will 
be subject to supplementary prudential supervision on a group-wide basis under the 
Financial Conglomerates Directive (FCD).  The FCD will use existing E.U. rules in each 
sector as building blocks for capital requirements at the conglomerate level.  As there is  
some degree of uncertainty regarding which sectoral rules will apply to asset 
management affiliates, it is unclear whether these entities will be subject to a regulatory 
capital charge for operational risk. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
30 None of these U.S. banking organizations are processing banks. 
31 The E.U. is considering a supervisory capital charge for operational risk as part of the proposed new 
capital framework for insurance, known as Solvency II.  However, Solvency II will not impose any charges 
on entities that are not legal subsidiaries of an insurance underwriter. 
  27  However, two of the firms we consider (Allianz and AXA) already calculate risk-
based capital (RBC) requirements for their various business entities, and both firms 
explicitly include operational risk in their RBC calculations.
32  So whether or not these 
firms face an explicit regulatory charge, they are already calculating and allocating 
economic capital for operational risk using methods that appear to be consistent with the 
Basel II AMA. 
 
4.  Would the Operational Risk Charge Imply an Increase in Total Actual Capital 
Held? 
  In considering the impact of an explicit regulatory capital charge for operational 
risk on processing banks, it is useful to distinguish between not only economic and 
regulatory capital, but also among a number of other capital concepts.  Economic capital, 
referred to frequently already, is the amount of capital that bank management believes it  
should hold to reflect the risks arising from the bank’s various positions and activities.
33  
To implement economic capital, banks have generally taken the approach of setting 
capital such that losses would exceed capital with no more than a small probability.  In 
the context of market risk, such an approach is typically referred to as Value at Risk 
(VaR).  The use of VaR models for market risk is now almost universal among large 
complex banks.  Similar techniques have been applied to credit risk, and more recently to 
operational risk. 
                                                           
32 See Allianz’s 2003 Annual Report (p. 25) and AXA’s 2003 Annual Report (pp. 150-151). 
33 The Federal Reserve has issued a supervisory letter on economic capital allocation, generally referred to 
as SR 99-18.  This letter directs bank supervisors to “evaluate internal capital management processes to 
judge whether they meaningfully tie the identification, monitoring, and evaluation of risk to the 
determination of the institution’s capital needs.” 
  28 Regulatory  capital, also discussed extensively above, is the minimum amount of 
capital that regulators require a bank to hold, and is defined under both Basel I and Basel 
II in terms of a minimum capital ratio of 8 percent of risk weighted assets.  Under Basel 
II, there is also a supervisory minimum capital ratio that is expected of banks, a minimum 
that varies with the supervisors’ evaluation of risk profiles.  In the United States, there is 
already an explicit supervisory minimum concept under Basel I; a U.S. bank must 
maintain a Tier I risk-based capital ratio above 6 percent, a total risk-based capital ratio  
above 10 percent, and a Tier I leverage ratio above 5 percent in order to be designated as 
“well-capitalized.”  Banks must be well-capitalized in order to conduct various activities, 
and must cease such activities if their capital falls toward the regulatory minimum. 
  A capital concept not yet discussed is market-determined capital, which is the 
amount of capital that market participants require an institution to hold.  In principle, 
market capital should equal economic capital, but the two may differ because of a lack of 
transparency or because of investor uncertainty.  Rating agencies play a key role in 
determining a bank’s market capital.  Many banks aim to hold sufficient capital to 
maintain target risk profiles (e.g., a AA debt rating), and adjust capital if rating agencies 
and analysts view actual capital to be inconsistent with the desired profile. 
  Virtually all U.S. banks hold capital above the regulatory and supervisory minima 
in order to meet economic and/or market-determined capital requirements.  Such excess 
regulatory capital may also be driven by a bank’s desire to hold buffer capital in excess 
of regulatory and supervisory requirements.  Buffer capital is necessary to absorb 
unexpected shocks to the balance sheet and earnings (e.g., unexpected losses from market 
risks undertaken, from investments made, or from business operations) without either 
  29facing more expensive or reduced funding, or being required by the supervisor or by 
statute to raise additional capital under adverse conditions. 
  Note that regulatory minimum capital and the total actual amount of capital held 
are the only capital concepts that can readily be observed by the public.  Neither 
economic capital, market capital, supervisory capital, nor buffer capital are readily 
compared across institutions, even though they might be the real driver of actual capital 
held.  Note also that the Basel II operational risk capital charge directly affects only 
regulatory capital.  It would affect the other measures only if these measures did not 
already include capital for operational risk. 
  By design, regulatory minimum capital is the smallest of all the capital concepts 
(and does not include any buffer capital) so as to minimize the risk that regulatory rules 
would affect business decisions.
34  Basel II retains the minimum regulatory capital 
concept of Basel I, but uses principles of economic capital to make the minimum 
regulatory capital measure more risk-sensitive.  Basel II also requires that banks adopting 
the AIRB and AMA approaches implement more modern and quantitative risk 
measurement and management techniques.  Nonetheless, Basel II’s minimum regulatory 
capital requirements are to be supplemented by supervisory judgment of any special risk 
characteristics of the individual bank.  Moreover, U.S. supervisors have made it clear that 
they expect banking organizations to continue to operate with capital above regulatory 
minima.  Similarly, at least one rating agency has indicated it would reduce its rating of 
any bank that lowered its capital to the new Basel II regulatory minimum.
35
                                                           
34 Basel I’s regulatory capital charge on residential mortgages is an example where that principle was not 
met, with the result that banks securitize a high percentage of their high-quality mortgage originations. 
35 See Simensen, Ivar. “Banks could face ratings cuts, warns S&P.” Financial Times, October 21, 2004. 
  30  Table 13 reports capital ratios for the four U.S. processing banks on a quarterly 
basis over the last two years.  Each has Tier 1 and total risk-based capital ratios in excess 
of the 6 percent and 10 percent thresholds for being designated by bank supervisors as 
well-capitalized.  Each also has a Tier 1 leverage ratio above the 5 percent well-
capitalized threshold.  As Basel II will not directly affect banks’ Tier 1 leverage ratios, 
we focus on the two risk-based capital ratios that will be directly affected.   
  The capital ratios presented in Table 13 suggest that the processing banks could 
absorb a modest regulatory capital charge for operational risk without having to raise 
additional capital.  To see this, suppose that the (additional) capital required for 
operational risk equaled one percent of a bank’s risk-weighted assets.  This amount 
corresponds to ten percent of a “well-capitalized” bank’s total risk-based capital 
requirement.  It is straightforward to verify that each processing bank’s risk-based capital 
ratios would remain above the well-capitalized thresholds after adjustment for the 
hypothetical new charge.
36   
  The preceding calculation is just an illustration.  There is little current information 
regarding the likely size of the operational risk charge, and none of this information 
applies to processing banks.
37  Thus, it is not possible empirically to determine how the  
                                                           
36 Let K denote a bank’s total risk-based capital, and RWA denote its risk-weighted assets.  After 
accounting for the hypothetical operational risk charge of 1 percent of RWA, the bank’s new Total RBC 
ratio would be K / (RWA + 12.5*0.01*RWA) = K/(RWA*1.125). 
37 In their 2003 Annual Reports, Citigroup disclosed 6.1 billion dollars and J.P. Morgan Chase disclosed   
3.5 billion dollars in economic capital for operational risk.  In its 2003 Annual Report, Wachovia disclosed 
5.6 billion dollars of total economic capital, 25 percent of which was for operational risk.  These figures 
imply a ratio of operational risk capital to risk weighted assets of 0.79 percent, 0.69 percent, and 0.50 
percent, respectively.  In addition, de Fontnouvelle et al. (2004) estimated the operational risk exposure of 
six large banks using internal data collected as part of the 2001 Loss Data Collection Exercise, and found 
that the median ratio of operational risk exposure to assets was 46 basis points. 
  31adoption of an operational risk charge would affect actual capital levels at the four U.S. 
processing banks.  However, a number of qualitative arguments may be made. 
  In principle, operational risk should already be reflected in the capital allocation 
decisions of banks practicing economic capital.  Furthermore, the market is keenly aware 
of operational risk, given recent high-profile operational losses at some financial 
institutions.
38  If processing banks are in fact already holding adequate economic/market 
capital for operational risk, they should not need to raise additional capital for this risk 
upon implementation of Basel II, unless the increase in regulatory capital results in a 
capital buffer that is too small to support management’s desired level of flexibility.  That 
is, the excess regulatory capital of the processing banks is not excess in any economic or 
market sense.  This “excess” measured amount – a statistical artifact – would decline 
after Basel II is implemented, but the competitive question is what is likely to happen to 
the amount of actual capital held, i.e. would the buffer be reduced below the desired 
level? 
  While all the processing banks hold excess regulatory capital, the effect of Basel 
II implementation on actual capital held is still an open question.  The practice of 
economic capital allocation is not universal, the market may not always require banks to  
                                                           
38 One of the largest recent operational losses occurred in May of 2004, when Citigroup agreed to pay $2.65 
billion to settle a class-action lawsuit brought by WorldCom shareholders.  In March of 2004, Bank of 
America paid a total of $455 million ($250 million in disgorgement and restitution, $125 million in fines, 
and $80 million in fee reductions) to settle for its role in the recent mutual fund market-timing scandal.  In 
2002, J.P. Morgan Chase recorded a $1.3 billion charge in connection with several Enron-related litigation 
and regulatory matters.  Also in 2002, Allied Irish Bank incurred losses of $691 million due to 
unauthorized trading that had occurred over the previous five years at its Allfirst subsidiary.  In 2001, 
Republic Bank paid $611M in restitution and  fines stemming from its role as custodian of securities sold 
by Princeton Economics International, which had issued false account statements and commingled client 
money.  Of course, these are only a few examples.  In all, more than one hundred operational losses 
exceeding $100 million have impacted financial firms over the past decade.   
  32hold sufficient economic capital, and an increase in minimum regulatory capital may 
lower a bank’s excess regulatory capital buffer below the level desired by bank 
management.  One reason for this uncertainty is that banks are opaque institutions, and it 
can be very difficult for outsiders to understand and quantify the full range of risks to 
which a bank is exposed (Morgan, 2002).  Another reason is that because of the bank 
safety net, the market may allow banks to operate with less capital than similar non-bank 
institutions (Berger et al., 1995, and Kwast and Passmore, 2000).  In addition, because 
FDICIA’s prompt corrective action and other provisions designed to shrink the safety net 
have not been fully tested in a banking crisis, stockholders and particularly uninsured 
creditors may believe they are less exposed to loss than would actually be the case.   
    If a bank is not allocating economic capital and/or the market is not requiring it to 
hold sufficient total actual capital, or if the excess regulatory capital buffer shrinks too 
far, then the new capital standards for operational risk may lead to an increase in actual 
capital held.  In this case, the bank would see its costs increase.  Meanwhile, competitors 
who are already practicing economic capital – as well as non-regulated competitors – 
would not see a change in their capital holdings. 
  As discussed previously, the data in Table 13 suggest that the processing banks 
may already hold sufficient capital to meet economic and market-determined capital that 
already includes capital for operational risk, as well as to absorb the new regulatory 
requirements and still have enough buffer capital to retain flexibility.  However, if a 
processing bank did have to raise additional capital to meet the Basel II standards, this 
should not necessarily be viewed as a negative outcome for either prudential or 
competitive equity reasons.  One purpose of the Basel Accord is to ensure that minimum 
  33regulatory capital for banks with access to the safety net is reflective of their risk profile.  
To the extent that this objective is achieved, stating that a bank’s total actual capital held 
will increase following Basel II may well be equivalent to stating that its current total 
actual capital held is lower than the economic capital at a rival bank or at a rival non-
regulated institution.  One could go so far as to argue that before the increase in such a 
bank’s total actual capital holding, the bank in question had an “unfair” competitive 
advantage over its non-regulated rivals.  Seen in this light, and considering only the case 
where Basel II resulted in an increase in total actual capital held by a processing bank, the 
new Accord might well rectify, not create, a competitive imbalance between banks and 
non-banks.  
  With this discussion of total actual capital held as background, we now turn to an 
attempt to estimate what the effect of an operational risk capital charge is likely to be for 
the competitive position of processing banks, business line by business line.  
 
5.  Is the Operational Risk Charge Likely to Have a Competitive Impact on the 
Processing Banks? 
  This section reviews the information presented in Sections 2 through 4 in order to 
address the questions raised in the introduction:  Is the new operational risk capital charge 
likely to have a competitive impact on the processing banks?  And if so, in what business 
lines is the impact most probable, and relative to what competitors?   
 
  345.1  Custody 
  As noted in Section 2, almost all custodians are banks.  In fact, all four U.S. 
processing banks rank among the top ten global custodians listed in Table 3.  The top ten 
custodians include two other U.S. banks (J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup) and four 
European banks (UBS, BNP Paribas, HSBC, and Societe Generale).  As noted in Section 
3, the two U.S. banks will adopt the Advanced Measurement Approach for operational 
risk (according to the American Banker), and the European banks will also be subject to 
an operational risk charge under Basel II.  The processing banks will thus not be at a 
competitive disadvantage relative to any of these institutions, which together account for 
80 percent of the assets under custody listed on Table 3.  As almost all of the smaller 
custodians listed in Table 3 will also be subject to Basel II, it appears unlikely that the 




5.2  Processing 
  In Section 2, we identified seventeen distinct processing business lines.  These 
include activities such as fund accounting, transfer agency, and securities lending.  We 
first consider bank-affiliated firms engaged in processing, as listed in the second panel of 
Table 10.  The processing banks are involved in most of the activities listed, as are what 
the American Banker believes would be five mandatory AMA banks and a probable opt-
                                                           
39 Neither SIS Segaintersettle AG (SIS) nor Brown Brothers Harriman (BBH) will be subject to an 
operational risk capital charge under Basel II.  SIS is owned by a group of Swiss banks (including UBS and 
Credit Suisse) and serves as a central securities depository for Switzerland.  BBH is a private bank 
structured as a partnership; while BBH does own a state-chartered bank, BBH is not a bank holding 
company and is not subject to consolidated banking supervision or capital regulation.   
  35in bank (PNC).  Also listed are three foreign-owned banks (ABN Amro, ING, and Royal 
Bank of Canada), that will be subject to an operational risk charge under Basel II. 
  There are four U.S. banks significantly engaged in processing activities that the 
American Banker does not identify as either mandatory or opt-in Basel II banks 
(Investors Bank & Trust, Marshall & Ilsley, UMB Financial, and U.S. Bancorp).  Each of 
these institutions engages in multiple processing activities.  If the new operational risk 
capital charge does raise the processing banks’ costs, these non-AMA U.S. banks may 
pose a competitive threat.  We would note, however, that two of the potential competitors 
(Marshall & Ilsley and US Bancorp) are primarily engaged in lower-risk credit activities, 
and may thus face higher overall capital charges if they remain under Basel I than if they 
opt in to Basel II.  These two banks also are assigned credit ratings by the ratings 
agencies.  The fact that their operational risk and associated risk management practices 
are part of the rating agencies’ assessments may further mitigate competitive concerns. 
  We next consider the non-bank firms engaged in processing, as listed in the first 
panel of Table 10.  These include four securities firms, three of which (Bear Stearns, 
Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch) have expressed interest in opting in to the SEC’s 
new CSE regime, in which case they would be subject to an operational risk charge.  The 
fourth (Southwest Securities) engages in only two of the seventeen processing activities, 
and is thus unlikely to pose a material threat to the processing banks.  Likewise, although 
the five insurance entities listed in Table 10 would not be subject to an explicit 
operational risk capital charge, their involvement in processing is narrow.
40
                                                           
40 The five insurance entities are Aon, Marsh & McLennan, Nationwide Financial, Prudential PLC, and 
Western-Southern Financial Group. 
  36  The other competitors listed in Table 10 are mostly non-financial firms, but also 
include several asset management firms (e.g., SEI Investments and T. Rowe Price).  The 
non-financials include firms such as Jack Henry and Omgeo that engage in just one 
processing activity, as well as firms such as BISYS and SEI Investments that engage in 
multiple activities.  As neither the non-financial firms nor the asset managers face any 
capital regulation, they stand to gain should the processing banks increase actual capital 
held because of the new requirements.  It is interesting to note, however, that the financial 
structure of these firms differs significantly from that of the processing banks.  That is, 
these firms all have equity-to-assets ratios exceeding 20 percent, with an average of 47 
percent across the 13 such firms reporting equity-to-assets.
41  The processing banks all 
have equity-to-assets ratios of ten percent or less.  This result is not surprising, as it is 
well-known that banks tend to be much more leveraged than non-financial firms.
42
  The difference in financial structure between banks and non-financial firms (and 
asset managers) should allay concerns regarding a level playing field in the processing 
market.  That the non-financial firms have such high equity-to-assets ratios suggests that 
were these firms subject to a Basel-like operational risk capital charge, such a regulation 
would not require the entities to raise any new capital because their capital held already  
                                                           
41 The 13 firms being referred to are ADP, Ceridian, DST Systems, EDS, Exult, Fiserv, Hewitt Associates, 
Jack Henry, SEI Investments, Sungard, T. Rowe Price, and Watson Wyatt. 
42 Various reasons for this difference have been proposed, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into 
them here.  Berger et al. (1995) and Orgler and Taggart (1983) provide an overview of this issue.  Diamond 
and Rajan (2000) is also relevant. 
  37exceeds the regulatory minimum by such a wide margin.
43  Furthermore, the non-
financial processors’ high equity-to-assets ratios suggest that they are in fact subject to a 
market-based capital requirement.  In fact, the median dollar value of equity across the 
thirteen non-bank processing firms mentioned above is approximately $1 billion.  
Although not subject to any regulatory capital requirement, these firms are subject to a 
market-determined capital requirement to cover all of their risks including operational 
risk.  In summary, the playing field appears level in the sense that banks will be held to 
certain capital standards under Basel II, and non-banks will be held to similar or higher 
standards by the market. 
 
5.3  Asset Management 
  As discussed in Section 2, we consider asset management as three separate 
markets: institutional asset management, mutual fund management, and private wealth 
management.  In addition, our background research suggested that institutional asset 
management is a global market, and the other two are U.S. markets. 
a.  Institutional Asset Management 
  As reported in Table 6, three of the U.S. processing banks rank among the top 
institutional asset managers.  State Street ranks first with $1.1 trillion in Assets Under 
                                                           
43 Ideally, market analysis would be done by business line, but unfortunately, such data are not available 
from public sources.  As a result, any competitive analysis based on firm-wide capital has the potential to 
overstate or understate capital allocated to particular business lines.  Nonetheless, the significant buffer 
over minimum capital requirements currently held by most processing banks, the fact that many banks are 
holding capital consistent with their economic capital models (which if accurate, should result in modest 
adjustments to the new regulatory standards), and the capital positions and capital requirements of most of 
their competitors likely indicates that minimum capital requirements are unlikely to be a driving force in 
these markets. 
  38Management (AUM), Mellon ranks fourth with $468 billion in AUM, and Northern Trust 
ranks eighth with $344 billion in AUM.   
  The other firms among the top fifty institutional asset managers reported in Table 
6 fall under multiple regulatory categories.  We first address the firms that are likely to 
face an operational risk capital charge in the near future.  These include entities that the 
American Banker believes will be AMA-Mandatory U.S. Banks (e.g., J.P. Morgan Chase, 
PNC, and Citigroup), as well as European banks that will also face a capital charge for 
operational risk under Basel II (Barclays, Deutsche Bank, UBS). The operational risk 
capital charge is unlikely to place processing banks at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-
vis these firms, who are all expected to face a similar charge.  The list of top institutional 
asset managers also includes several U.S. investment banks (Merrill Lynch, Goldman 
Sachs, and Morgan Stanley) that have expressed interest in opting in to the SEC’s CSE 
regime, in which case they would also face a capital charge for operational risk.   
  We next address firms that are not expected to face a regulatory operational risk 
capital charge.
44  These can be divided into three groups.  The first group consists of asset 
management affiliates of U.S. insurance companies.  Several of these entities appear to 
have a significant amount of institutional AUM.  Of the firms listed in Table 6, AIG 
ranks sixth with $416 billion in AUM and TIAA-CREF ranks twelfth with $302 billion in 
AUM.  However, neither of these firms is a direct competitor to the processing banks:  
approximately 90 percent of AIG’s reported AUM consists of the assets of various AIG 
insurance companies rather than third-party client assets, and TIAA-CREF’s primary 
market is providing defined contribution retirement plans to nonprofit education and 
                                                           
44 Two non-AMA U.S. banks are also active in institutional asset management:  Metlife and Franklin 
Resources.  However, these are small players in the IAM market, ranking 38th and 41st, respectively. 
  39research organizations.
45  The next largest insurance affiliate listed on Table 6 is 
Prudential Financial, whose third-party institutional AUM are quite modest at less than 
$150 billion.
46  We conclude that asset management affiliates of U.S. insurance 
companies are a limited presence in the institutional asset management market, and as 
such should not pose a significant competitive threat to the processing banks. 
  The second group of firms that are not expected to face an operational risk capital 
charge consists of asset management affiliates of two E.U. insurance conglomerates, 
Allianz and AXA.  As discussed in Section 3, both of these firms include an operational 
risk calculation in their risk-based capital requirements for their various business entities.  
As the aim of the Basel II AMA is to align regulatory capital with this type of economic 
capital model, the processing banks should not be disadvantaged vis-à-vis these two 
firms. 
  The third group of firms that are not expected to face an operational risk charge 
consists of stand-alone asset managers (SAMs) such as Fidelity Investments and 
Vanguard.  As SAMs currently manage $3 trillion of the $12 trillion of institutional 
assets reported in Table 6, any increase in banks’ capital costs that might have to be 
recaptured in their pricing could lead to an erosion in their market share relative to these 
competitors.  The three most significant SAMs (Fidelity, Wellington, and Vanguard) do 
not publicly report their financial ratios.  However, there are eight smaller SAMs in Table 
6 that do, and the average equity-to-assets ratio across these eight is 57 percent.  As was 
                                                           
45 On page 11 of AIG’s 2003 Annual Report, it is stated that AIG Global Investment Group manages $395 
billion of assets for AIG’s insurance companies and $46 billion of assets for third-party clients. 
46 Prudential Financial’s quarterly financial supplement for the fourth quarter of 2003 states that the 
Investment Division manages $94.8 billion of assets for institutional customers.  The International 
Insurance and Investments Division manages an additional $53.9 billion in assets, although the breakdown 
of this figure between internal insurance funds, retail customers, and institutional customers is not reported. 
  40argued in Section 5.2 for processing, the stand-alone asset managers’ unleveraged capital 
structure should allay concerns regarding a level playing field between banks and non-
banks competing in this market.  
b.  Mutual Fund Management 
  The processing banks do not have a dominant presence in the mutual fund market.  
If Mellon does not opt in to Basel II, State Street and Northern Trust would be the only 
processing banks subject to the new operational risk charge among the top fifty mutual 
fund families.  State Street’s and Northern’s combined mutual fund assets account for 
less than 2 percent of the assets reported in Table 7. We will thus not review in detail all 
the other firms that compete in this market.   
  However, it is informative to consider the most significant group of competitors – 
stand-alone asset managers such as Fidelity Investments, Vanguard, and the Capital 
Group.  Together, these firms have almost $3 trillion in assets under management, more 
than half of all AUM reported in Table 7.  As was the case for processing and 
institutional asset management, the stand-alone asset managers’ capital structure (equity-
to-assets ratios of 60 percent or higher for those reporting) should allay concerns 
regarding a level playing field between banks and non-banks.  The stand-alone asset 
managers’ high equity-to-assets ratios also suggest that economic and market capital for 
mutual fund management could be high.  For all of these reasons, we would not expect 
the new charge for operational risk to be a significant competitive issue, as it seems 
unlikely to exceed economic/market capital requirements for this business line. 
  41c.  Private Wealth Management 
  There are comparatively more banks engaged in private wealth management than 
in either institutional or mutual fund management.  The 27 banks listed in Table 8 include 
thirteen projected AMA U.S. banks and two foreign banks, all of whom are expected to 
adopt Basel II.  Investment banks (Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, 
Lehman Brothers) are also a significant presence in this market.
47  All of these firms have 
expressed interest in opting in to the SEC’s new CSE regime, which imposes an 
operational risk charge calculated in accordance with Basel II. 
  Other competitors in private wealth management include two stand-alone asset 
managers, Fidelity Investments and T. Rowe Price.  Although neither of these firms faces 
a regulatory charge for operational risk, we saw in previous sections that the market 
probably requires both to hold significant economic capital for operational risk.  There 
are also twelve non-AMA banks listed in Table 8.  As discussed previously, most of these  
institutions would likely see a higher capital charge under Basel I than if they were to opt 
in to Basel II.
48   
d. Other issues. 
  As discussed at the end of section 4, another factor that must be considered that 
overarches the competitive position of processing banks vis-à-vis non-bank competitors 
in all these markets is that the former have direct access to the federal safety net while 
                                                           
47 Lehman Brothers competes in the private wealth management market via its Neuberger Berman 
subsidiary. 
48 We verified that the majority of the 11 non-AMA banks have a significant loan portfolio (a loan-to-assets 
ratio exceeding 50 percent), and would thus likely see a reduced capital charge under Basel II.  Four of 
these banks (Schwab, Bessemer Trust, Franklin, Glenmede) had loan-to-assets ratios of less than 50 
percent.  However, we also verified that as of 6/30/03 (the date for Table 8), these four all had very high 
RBC ratios of 20 percent or more.  So, it is unlikely that they would need to raise additional capital even if 
they did opt in to Basel II. 
  42their non-bank rivals do not.  This provides a competitive advantage to banks in three 
ways.  First, banks have direct access to the discount window without special action by 
the Federal Reserve Board, access that confers a liquidity backup particularly important 
to processing bank customers.  Second, banks’ direct access to Fedwire enables them to 
move both funds and U.S. government securities more rapidly and cheaply than their 
non-bank rivals.  Finally, the prudential supervision of banks, in the perception of many 
customers, confers to them a certification of strength also not available to their rivals.  
These factors help to explain the higher leverage that the market permits banks, for the 
same level of risk, and suggests that higher regulatory minimum capital is likely still to 
leave both economic and total actual capital held lower at banks than at their rivals. 
 
6.  Conclusion  
  Basel II replaces Basel I’s implicit capital charge on operational risk with an 
explicit charge.  Certain U.S. banks likely to adopt Basel II are concentrated in business 
lines that involve minimal credit risk, and could thus face an increase in regulatory 
capital requirements because of the new explicit regulatory capital charge for operational 
risk.  Some have argued that as a result, the new operational risk capital charge would put 
these processing banks at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis non-AIRB U.S. banks,  
foreign banks, and non-banks with whom they compete.
49  To address these concerns, we 
have considered the five business activities in which the processing banks engage:  
                                                           
49 This paper has focused on the argument that the treatment of operational risk under Basel II would affect 
a bank’s cost structure – and hence its competitiveness – by increasing the amount of capital held by the 
bank.  However, it can be argued that a bank implementing an AMA for operational risk also incurs costs 
stemming from investments in risk management personnel and infrastructure.  Although a full treatment is 
outside the scope of this paper, we will make two points relevant to addressing this argument.  First, banks 
would continue to perform many operational risk management activities (and to incur the associated costs) 
even in the absence of Basel II.  For example, there is significant overlap between the investments required 
  43custody, institutional asset management, mutual fund management, private wealth 
management, and general processing.   This section briefly reviews our findings for each. 
Most global custodians are banks, almost all of which are expected to adopt Basel 
II.  The likelihood that the operational risk charge would have a competitive impact on 
the processing banks thus appears small.  In institutional asset management, the main 
competitors not subject to a regulatory charge for operational risk will be stand-alone 
asset managers, as well as the asset management affiliates of two European insurance 
groups.  However, the stand-alone asset managers’ high equity-to-assets ratios suggest 
that the market already requires them to hold economic capital sufficient to cover  
their operational risk exposures, and the two European insurance groups already 
incorporate operational risk in their risk-based capital calculations.  
The processing banks do not have a dominant presence in the mutual fund market.  
If Mellon does not opt in to Basel II, State Street and Northern Trust would be the only 
processing banks subject to the new operational risk charge among the top fifty mutual  
fund families.  State Street’s and Northern’s combined mutual fund assets account for 
less than 2 percent of the assets reported in Table 7.  The main competitors not subject to 
an operational risk charge will be stand-alone asset managers, who are highly capitalized 
and might not need to raise additional capital even if subject to Basel II. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
for Basel II compliance and those required for compliance with both FDICIA and Sarbanes-Oxley – and 
also with those required for compliance with the internal control best practices laid out by the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO).  The second point is that the same 
arguments suggesting that any increase in the processing banks’ capital costs would not necessarily have a 
competitive impact also suggest that any increase in infrastructure costs would not necessarily have a 
competitive impact.  That is, many of the processing banks’ significant competitors – especially in custody 
and private wealth management – will also be required to invest in operational risk management under 
Basel II or equivalent regulation. 
  44Three U.S. processing banks rank among the top U.S. private wealth managers.  
They face competition in this market from investment banks, AMA banks, and foreign 
banks, all of which will face an operational risk charge under Basel II or its equivalent.  
The processing banks also face competition from non-AMA banks that will not be 
subject to an explicit capital charge for operational risk.  However, these banks would 
remain subject to Basel I’s implicit operational risk charge, and are expected to face 
higher overall capital requirements than if they were to opt in to Basel II. 
In processing, banks face potential competition from numerous firms that are not 
subject to capital regulation.  However, these non-bank competitors tend to be highly 
capitalized – as evidenced by their high equity-to-assets ratios – and do not have the 
benefits from the federal safety net that banks enjoy.  The competitive impact of the 
operational risk capital charge could be blunted further by the fact that many processing 
services are bundled with custody. 
  These arguments and evidence suggest that the potential competitive effects of the 
Basel II operational risk charge will be, at most, modest.  The processing banks hold 
considerable capital in excess of the regulatory minima under Basel II, suggesting that 
they are already covering their operational risks in order to satisfy market/rating agency 
demands. This having been said, the operational risk charge under Basel II could still 
reduce buffer capital levels below that desired by management for flexibility and other 
reasons.  If, as a result, processing banks raised additional capital, their costs could rise, 
adversely impacting their competitive position.  Although our analysis of capital ratios 
suggests that U.S. processing banks are most likely to be able to accommodate the new 
charge for operational risk without increasing total actual capital levels, the analysis is 
  45not, and cannot be made, definitive.  If the processing banks’ total actual capital held 
does increase due to Basel II, and the non-banks’ total actual capital held is unchanged, 
processing banks could face reduced profits or market share.  
  However, this possibility should be viewed in perspective.  Although the minimal 
leverage displayed by non-banks does not eliminate the potential for a competitive impact 
on banks, it does affect the interpretation of this possible impact – in the unlikely event it 
should occur.  As none of these non-bank firms has access to the safety net or faces any 
regulatory capital requirements, their relatively high equity-to-assets ratios can be 
considered a proxy for the capital the market requires for asset management and 
processing activities.  Thus, even if the operational risk charge leads to an increase in 
total actual capital held by banks under Basel II, it appears that the new requirements 
would still be less than the amount of economic/market capital held by prudently-run 
asset management and processing firms that do not have access to the benefits of the 
federal safety net provided to banks.   
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1 Charles Schwab Corporation            78% 31% $46
2 State Street 76% 7% $88
3 Mellon Financial Corporation 73% 22% $34
4 Taunus Corporation            73% 7% $291
5 Northern Trust 60% 43% $41
6 The Bank of New York 60% 37% $92
7S ynovus Financial              58% 75% $22
8 CIBC Delaware 50% 31% $39
9 PNC Financial 46% 49% $68
10 Marshall & Ilsley 43% 72% $34
11 Huntington Bancshares 41% 68% $31
12 Bankmont FC                    35% 48% $39
13 JPMorgan Chase 35% 25% $771
14 Wachovia Corporation           33% 42% $401
15 Citigroup 32% 38% $1,264
16 Regions FC 30% 65% $49
17 US Bancorp 29% 61% $189
18 FleetBoston Financial 28% 62% $200
19 Keycorp 27% 70% $84
20 Fifth Third Bank 27% 57% $91
21 Utrecht-American Holdings 27% 63% $27
22 Bank of America Corporation 26% 50% $736
23 MBNA Corporation 26% 33% $59
24 Wells Fargo & Co.          26% 64% $388
25 Suntrust Bank 25% 64% $125
26 ABN AMRO North America 25% 40% $127
27 Bank One Corporation 22% 48% $327
28 National City Corporation      21% 69% $114
29 First Tennessee National Corporation 19% 56% $25
30 Comerica 19% 75% $53
31 HSBC North America 18% 53% $126
32 National Commerce Financial Corporation 18% 56% $23
33 Popular 17% 60% $36
34 UnionBanCal Corporation          17% 60% $42
35 Union Planters Corporation 16% 68% $32
36 AmSouth Bank                 16% 63% $46
37 BB&T Corporation 16% 67% $90
38 M&T Bank Corporation 15% 69% $50
39 Zions Bank 15% 68% $29
40 BankNorth Group          15% 61% $26
41 Southtrust Corporation       15% 67% $52
42 Citizens Financial Group     14% 55% $78
43 Compass Bancshares 13% 63% $27
44 MetLife 13% 11% $327
45 Charter One Financial 12% 66% $43
46 Bancwest Corporation                 11% 66% $38
47 Commerce Bank 10% 32% $23
48 New York Community Bank       5% 44% $24
49 Greenpoint FC       4% 43% $23
50 Countrywide FC          –8%
c 26.9% $98
a Source: Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C).
b Operational income is defined as income from the following sources:  (i) fiduciary activities, (ii)  investment banking, advisory, brokerage 
and underwriting, (iii) venture capital, (iv) servicing, and (v) other noninterest income earning activities as defined in the instructions to the 
form FR Y-9C.  Insurance underwriting income is excluded from both noninterest income and total income as it is anticipated that such non-
credit related activities would be carved out of the Basel II provisions.
c Countrywide's ratio is negative as it has negative income from net servicing fees that more than offsets other positive income from 
operational activities. Reported servicing income is net of the related servicing assets' amortization expense.
Table 1: Financial Ratios for the Top 50 U.S. Bank Holding Companies as of 12/31/03
aTable 2: List of Discussions Held with External Sources
Processing Banks
The Bank of New York Corporation
Mellon Financial Corporation Corporate & Institutional Services
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1 State Street $9,400 x x x x x A, B, I, R
2 The Bank of New York $8,577 x x x x x A, B, I, R
3 JPMorgan Chase $8,014 x x x x x A, B, I, R
4 Citigroup $6,381 x x x x x A, B, I, R
5 Mellon Financial Corporation $2,903 x x x x A, I, R
6 UBS Group $2,398 x A, B, I, R
7 Northern Trust $2,300 x x x x x A, B, I, R
8 BNP Paribas  $2,167 x x x A, B, I, R
9 HSBC $1,483 x x x A, B, R
10 Societe Generale $1,465 x A, C
11 SIS Swiss Financial Services Group $1,329 x B, Br
12 RBC Global Services $1,182 x x x x x A, B, I, R
13 Investors Financial Services $1,131 x x x A, B, I, R
14 Brown Brothers Harriman $950 x x x x x A, B, I, R
15 Wachovia Corporation $854 x A, B, C
16 Credit Agricole Group $691 x A, C
17 CDC Ixis $623 x A, B
18 Banca Intesa  $550 x A, R
19 Nordea Bank $466 x A
20 Fortis Group $450 x A, B, I, R
21 UniCredito Italiano $414 A, B, I, R
22 PNC Financial  $400 x A, I
23 Dexia Fund Services $382 x x A, B, I, R
24 ING $375 x C
25 SEB Merchant Banking $256 x A
26 National Australia Group $235 x A, R
27 KAS Bank $210 x B, I, R
28 Fifth Third Bank $194 x A, I, R
29 Pictet & Cie $162 x x A, Pr
30 Mitsubishi Tokyo Fncl. Group (Union Bank of CA) $140 x A, B, I, R
31 HVB Group (Bank Austria Creditanstalt) $120 x Br
32 Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch $91 x P, I
33 Svenska Handelsbanken $90 x C
34 Bank of Ireland $89 x A, H
35 Credit Suisse (Swiss American Securities) $70 x B, Br
36 DBS Bank, Ltd $57 x C
37 Millennium BCP (Banco Comercial Portugues) $49 x C
38 Bank Julius Baer $31 x B, Br, I, R
39 Credit Suisse (Bank Leu) $30 x B, Br
40 Daiwa Securities $17 x A, B, P
41 Nikko Bank $2 x C
Panel a: Assets Under Custody from globalcustody.net
a Panel b: Additional Information
b Companies listed are the top holders of the custody providers listed on 
GlobalCustody.net and descriptive data are consolidated figures for top 
holders. To the extent that these companies provide custody services under 
a subsidiary with a different name, we have tried to identify these 
companies by including them in parentheses after the top holder.
d  The Global Investor Survey refers to the Global 
Custody Survey in the May 2004 issue of Global 
Investor Magazine.   An "x" indicates that the company 
is included in this survey.
c  The Buttonwood Survey is an annual survey of the 
major global custodians.  An "x" indicates that the 
company is included in this survey.
e Key to client focus: A=Asset Managers, B=Banks, 
Br=Brokers, Brokerage Houses and Financial Services, 
C=Corporate and Institutional Clients, H=Hedge Funds, 
I=Insurance Companies, P=Pension Funds, Pr=Private 
Clients, R=Retirement Services.
a  © 2004 globalcustody.net
   Source:  www.globalcustody.net
Top providers and worldwide assets under custody from GlobalCustody.net 
on 6/14/2004, based on the most recent data as of that date.  Reprinted with 
permission. GlobalCustody.net only lists 41 providers. Provider name has 




















1 State Street $9,400 $88 6.6% 14.0% 15.8% 5.6%
2 The Bank of New York $8,577 $92 9.1% 7.4% 11.5% 5.8%
3 JPMorgan Chase $8,014 $771 6.0% 8.5% 11.8% 5.6%
4 Citigroup $6,381 $1,264 7.8% 8.9% 12.0% 5.6%
5 Mellon Financial Corporation $2,903 $34 10.9% 8.6% 13.5% 7.9%
6 UBS Group $2,398 $1,116 2.9% 11.8% 13.3% –
7 Northern Trust $2,300 $41 7.4% 11.1% 14.0% 7.6%
8 BNP Paribas  $2,167 $984 4.2% 9.4% 12.9% –
9 HSBC $1,483 $1,035 8.3% 8.9% 12.0% –
10 Societe Generale $1,465 $677 3.9% 8.7% 11.7% –
11 SIS Swiss Financial Services Group $1,329 $1 14.7% – – –
12 RBC Global Services $1,182 $306 4.6% 9.7% 12.8% –
13 Investors Financial Services $1,131 $9 5.9% 17.8% 17.8% 5.4%
14 Brown Brothers Harriman $950 $3 8.7% – – –
15 Wachovia Corporation $854 $401 8.7% 8.5% 11.8% 6.4%
16 Credit Agricole Group $691 $987 3.5% 7.9% 8.9% –
17 CDC Ixis $623 $169 – – – –
18 Banca Intesa  $550 $326 5.7% 7.8% 11.7% –
19 Nordea Bank $466 $329 4.6% 7.3% 9.3% –
20 Fortis Group $450 $657 2.7% 7.9% 12.4% –
21 UniCredito Italiano $414 $299 5.9% 7.0% 11.1% –
22 PNC Financial  $400 $68 10.4% 9.5% 13.8% 8.2%
23 Dexia Fund Services $382 $439 2.8% 9.9% 11.2% –
24 ING $375 $978 3.2% 7.6% 11.3% –
25 SEB Merchant Banking $256 $177 3.8% 8.0% 10.2% –
26 National Australia Group $235 $271 7.1% 7.5% 9.4% –
27 KAS Bank $210 $10 2.7% 20.0% 25.0% –
28 Fifth Third Bank $194 $91 9.4% 10.9% 13.4% 9.1%
29 Pictet & Cie $162 – – – – –
30 Mitsubishi Tokyo Fncl. Group (Union Bank of CA)
d $140 $1,023 4.0% 7.1% 13.0% –
31 HVB Group (Bank Austria Creditanstalt) $120 $172 4.5% 7.8% 13.1% –
32 Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch $91 – – – – –
33 Svenska Handelsbanken $90 $175 4.5% 7.1% 10.0% –
34 Bank of Ireland $89 $131 4.0% 7.2% 11.3% –
35 Credit Suisse (Swiss American Securities) $70 $775 3.4% 11.7% 17.4% –
36 DBS Bank, Ltd $57 $94 10.0% 10.5% 15.1% –
37 Millennium BCP (Banco Comercial Portugues) $49 $85 6.4% 7.1% 11.8% –
38 Bank Julius Baer $31 $11                19.1% – –
39 Credit Suisse (Bank Leu) $30 $775 3.4% 11.7% 17.4% –
40 Daiwa Securities $17 $11 5.6% – – –
41 Nikko Bank $2 $10 – – – –
c Companies listed are the top holders of the custody providers listed on 
GlobalCustody.net and additional data are consolidated figures for top holders. 
To the extent that these companies provide custody services under a subsidiary 
with a different name, we have tried to identify these companies by including 
them in parentheses after the top holder.
d Data as of 03/31/04 for this firm.
b Source: Bloomberg L.P. Data are as of December 
31, 2003.  Data for unlisted firms is taken from their 
Annual Reports.
Table 4: Largest Global Custodians as of 6/14/04
Panel b: Additional Information
b Panel a: Assets Under Custody from globalcustody.net
a
a               © 2004 globalcustody.net
            Source:  www.globalcustody.net
Top providers and worldwide assets under custody taken from 
GlobalCustody.net on 6/14/2004, based on the most recent data as of that date. 
Reprinted with permission. GlobalCustody.net only lists 41 providers. Provider 













1 UBS Group $1,782 $1,116 2.9% 11.8% 13.3% –
2 Allianz $1,327 $1,176 3.9% –– –
3 Fidelity Investments $1,139 – – – – –
4 State Street $1,106 $88 6.6% 14.0% 15.8% 5.6%
5 Barclays $1,070 $791 3.8% 7.9% 12.8% –
6 AXA Group $973 $438 c 7.4% c –– –
7 Credit Suisse $971 $775 3.4% 11.7% 17.4% –
8 Kampo $877 – – – – –
9 Capital Group $814 – – – – –
10 Vanguard Group $725 – – – – –
11 Deutsche Bank $715 $1,010 3.5% 10.0% 13.9% –
12 Mellon Financial Corporation $617 $34 10.9% 8.6% 13.5% 7.9%
13 Citigroup $609 $1,264 7.8% 8.9% 12.0% 5.6%
14 ING $590 $978 3.2% 7.6% 11.3% –
15 JPMorgan Chase $559 $771 6.0% 8.5% 11.8% 5.6%
16 Merrill Lynch $500 $495 6.1% – – –
17 Northern Trust $479 $41 7.4% 11.1% 14.0% 7.6%
18 Credit Agricole $477 $987 3.5% 7.9% 8.9% –
19 Morgan Stanley $450 $603 4.6% – – –
20 AIG Global Investment Group $441 $618 c 11.6% c –– –
21 Prudential Financial $432 $215 c 9.9% c –– –
22 Aviva $427 $372 3.5% – – –
23 HSBC $399 $1,035 8.3% 8.9% 12.0% –
24 CDC Ixis $397 $169 – – – –
25 Wellington Management $394 – – – – –
26 Fortis Group $384 $657 2.7% 7.9% 12.4% –
27 American Express $366 $175 8.8% – – –
28 AMVESCAP $365 $7 54.3% – – –
29 Societe Generale $356 $677 3.9% 8.7% 11.7% –
30 Nippon Life Insurance $355 d ––– ––
31 MetLife $350 $251 c 8.4% c 9.2% 11.2% 6.1%
32 Generali $348 $229 c 4.7% c –– –
33 Goldman Sachs $348 $404 5.4% – – –
34 BNP Paribas $346 $984 4.2% 9.4% 12.9% –
35 Aegon $346 $294 6.0% – – –
36 Franklin Resources $337 $7 62.8% 66.0% 66.0% 45.0%
37 Bank of America Corporation $336 $736 6.5% 7.9% 11.9% 5.7%
38 Norinchukin Bank Group (Zenkyoren) $331 d $585 f 4.1% 7.5% 12.9% –
39 PNC Financial (BlackRock Inc) $309 $68 10.4% 9.5% 13.8% 8.2%
40 TIAA-CREF $307 $298 c 4.2% c –– –
41 MassMutual Financial $285 $66 c 9.5% c –– –
42 Prudential plc $279 $252.9 c 2.4% c –– –
43 Legg Mason Wood Walker Inc. $278 $7 21.8% – – –
44 Sunlife Financial $277 $126 12.8% – – –
45 Wachovia Corporation $248 $401 8.7% 8.5% 11.8% 6.4%
46 Charles Schwab Corporation $245 $46 9.7% 20.3% 20.4% 8.2%
47 Legal & General Group $242 $218 c 3.0% c –– –
48 Putnam Investments $240 $15 36.2% – – –
49 Mitsubishi Tokyo Fncl. Group $239 e $1,023 f 4.0% 7.1% 13.0% –
50 Dai-ichi Mutual Life Insurance $235 d ––– ––
e Assets under management as of 9/30/03 for this firm.
f Additional data as of 3/31/04 for this firm.
Table 5: Largest Global Asset Managers as of 12/31/03
Panel a: AUM from P&I/Watson Wyatt
a Panel b: Additional Information
b
c Total assets exclude separate accounts. 
Total Assets 
(billions)
b Source: Bloomberg L.P. Data are as of December 31, 2003. 
Data for unlisted firms is taken from their Annual Reports.
a Data from P&I/Watson Wyatt Megamanagers. Reprinted with permission, Pensions & 

















1 State Street $1,097 $88 6.6% 14.0% 15.8% 5.6%
2 Barclays $958 $791 3.8% 7.9% 12.8% –
3 Fidelity Investments $730 – – – – –
4 Mellon Financial Corporation $468 $34 10.9% 8.6% 13.5% 7.9%
5 Deutsche Bank (Deutsche Asset Mgmt.) $467 $1,010 3.5% 10.0% 13.9% –
6 AIG Global Investment Group $416 $618 c 11.6% c –– –
7 Wellington Management $394 – – – – –
8 Northern Trust $344 $41 7.4% 11.1% 14.0% 7.6%
9 Vanguard Group $329 – – – – –
10 Allianz (Pacific Investment Mgmt.) $321 $1,176 3.9% – – –
11 JPMorgan Chase (JPMorgan Fleming Asset Mgmt.) $317 $771 6.0% 8.5% 11.8% 5.6%
12 TIAA-CREF $302 $298 c 4.2% c –– –
13 PNC Financial (BlackRock Inc) $289 $68 10.4% 9.5% 13.8% 8.2%
14 Capital Group
d $281 – – – – –
15 Citigroup (Citigroup Asset Mgmt.) $279 $1,264 7.8% 8.9% 12.0% 5.6%
16 AXA Group (Alliance Capital Mgmt.) $270 $438 c 7.4% c –– –
17 UBS Group (UBS Global Asset Mgmt.)
e $265 $1,116 2.9% 11.8% 13.3% –
18 Prudential Financial $267 $215 c 9.9% c –– –
19 Merrill Lynch $253 $495 6.1% – – –
20 Goldman Sachs (Goldman Sachs Asset Mgmt.) $246 $404 5.4% – – –
21 Credit Suisse (Credit Suisse Asset Mgmt.) $219 $775 3.4% 11.7% 17.4% –
22 Legg Mason Wood Walker Inc. $203 $7 21.8% – – –
23 Bank of America Corp (Banc Of America Capital Mgmt.) $202 $736 6.5% 7.9% 11.9% 5.7%
24 Federated Investors Inc. $181 $1 45.1% – – –
25 Morgan Stanley $174 $603 4.6% – – –
26 GE Asset Management Inc. $172 $647 13.1% – – –
27 MassMutual Financial
f $160 $66 c 9.5% c –– –
28 Wachovia Corporation (Evergreen Investments) $152 $401 8.7% 8.5% 11.8% 6.4%
29 ING
g $144 $978 3.2% 7.6% 11.3% –
30 General Motors Asset Management $142 $450 5.7% – – –
31 AMVESCAP (Invesco) $141 $7 54.3% – – –
32 American Express $139 $175 8.8% – – –
33 NY Life Group (NY Life Investment Mgmt. Holdings) $132 $116 c 12.5% c –– –
34 Schroder (Schroder Investment Mgmt. N America) $127 $5 39.4% – – –
35 Standard Life Group (Standard Life Investments Ltd.) $120 – – – – –
36 Bank One Corporation (Banc One Investment Advisors) $118 $327 7.2% 10.0% 13.7% 8.8%
37 BNP Paribas (BNP Paribas Asset Mgmt. Inc.) $114 $984 4.2% 9.4% 12.9% –
38 MetLife $110 $251 c 8.4% c 9.2% 11.2% 6.1%
39 T. Rowe Price Associates $104 $2 85.9% – – –
40 Franklin Resources (Franklin Templeton Investments) $102 $7 62.8% 66.0% 66.0% 45.0%
41 Janus Capital Group $101 $4 61.5% – – –
42 Principal Global Investors $100 – – – – –
43 HHG PLC (Henderson Global Investors) $99 – – – – –
44 Eureko (F&C Mgmt.) $96 $51 4.4% – – –
45 Dodge & Cox $90 – – – – –
46 HSBC (HSBC Asset Mgmt.) $85 $1,035 8.3% 8.9% 12.0% –
47 Marsh & McLennan (Putnam Investments) $84 $15 36.2% – – –
48 Societe Generale (TCW Group) $69 $677 3.9% 8.7% 11.7% –
49 CIGNA Corp (CIGNA Retirement) $68 $56 c 8.1% c –– –
50 Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance (Russell Investment) $66 $101 c 10.0% c –– –
Table 6: Largest Global Institutional Asset Managers as of 12/31/03
Panel a: Institutional AUM from P&I Online
a Panel b: Additional Information
b
g Includes ING and ING Clarion.




b Source: Bloomberg L.P. Data are as of December 31, 2003. 
Data for unlisted firms is taken from their Annual Reports.
a Data from "2004 Largest US Money Managers." Reprinted with permission, Pensions & 
Investments  (online). Copyright, Crain Communications, Inc. 
d Includes Capital Research & Management Co. and Capital Guardian Trust Co. 
e Includes UBS Global Asset Management (Canada).
Equity to 
Assets



















1 Fidelity Investments (Fidelity Mgmt. Research) $805 – – – – –
2 Vanguard Group (Vanguard Group Investment ) $713 – – – – –
3 Capital Group (Capital Research & Mgmt. ) $494 – – – – –
4 Franklin Resources
c $194 $7 62.8% 66.0% 66.0% 45.0%
5 Federated Investors Inc.
c $175 $1 45.1% – – –
6 Morgan Stanley
c $151 $603 4.6% – – –
7 Charles Schwab Corporation
c $149 $46 9.7% 20.3% 20.4% 8.2%
8 Mellon Financial Corporation (Dreyfus Corporation) $145 $34 10.9% 8.6% 13.5% 7.9%
9 Allianz (Allianz Dresdner Asset Mgmt America)
c $141 $1,176 3.1% – – –
10 Marsh & McLennan (Putnam Investments) $136 $15 36.2% – – –
11 Citigroup
c $135 $1,264 7.8% 8.9% 12.0% 5.6%
12 Merrill Lynch $125 $495 6.1% – – –
13 T. Rowe Price Associates
c $124 $2 85.9% –– –
14 Bank of America Corporation (Banc of America Advisors) $120 $736 6.5% 7.9% 11.9% 5.7%
15 AMVESCAP
c $114 $7 54.3% – – –
16 Janus Capital Group $111 $4 61.5% – – –
17 MassMutual Financial
c $104 $66 d 9.5% d –– –
18 Bank One Corporation (Banc One Investment Advisors) $101 $327 7.2% 10.0% 13.7% 8.8%
19 Goldman Sachs (Goldman Sachs Asset Mgmt.) $100 $404 5.4% – – –
20 Wachovia Corporation (Evergreen Investment Mgmt.) $100 $401 8.7% 8.5% 11.8% 6.4%
21 Deutsche Bank (Scudder Investments) $95 $1,010 3.5% 10.0% 13.9% –
22 JPMorgan Chase (JPMorgan Fleming Asset Mgmt.) $87 $771 6.0% 8.5% 11.8% 5.6%
23 AXA Group
c $87 $438 d 7.4% d –– –
24 Sunlife Financial (MFS Investment Mgmt.) $80 $126 d 12.8% d –– –
25 American Century Investments $78 – – – – –
26 Wells Fargo & Co.  $75 $388 8.9% 8.4% 12.2% 6.9%
27 FleetBoston Financial
c $72 $200 9.1% 8.9% 12.0% 8.7%
28 American Express (American Express Financial Advisors) $69 $175 8.8% – – –
29 PNC Financial (BlackRock Institutional Mgmt. Corp.) $62 $68 10.4% 9.5% 13.8% 8.2%
30 Barclays (Barclays Global Fund Advisors) $60 $791 3.8% 7.9% 12.8% –
31 PDR Services
e $57 – – – – –
32 Hartford Investment Fin Svc $56 $226 5.2% – – –
33 UBS Group (UBS Global Asset Mgmt.) $50 $1,116 2.9% 11.8% 13.3% –
34 Dodge & Cox  $49 – – – – –
35 US Bancorp (US Bancorp Asset Mgmt.) $49 $189 10.2% 9.1% 13.6% 8.0%
36 Prudential Financial (Prudential Securities) $47 $215 d 9.9% d –– –
37 Northern Trust $44 $41 7.4% 11.1% 14.0% 7.6%
38 State Street
c $42 $88 6.6% 14.0% 15.8% 5.6%
39 Lord Abbett & Co. $40 – – – – –
40 SEI Investments Inc $39 $1 61.4% – – –
41 Legg Mason Wood Walker Inc.
c $32 $7 21.8% – – –
42 Selected/Venture Advisers L.P. $31 – – – – –
43 USAA Investment Management  $28 – – – – –
44 Dimensional Fund Advisors  $28 – – – – –
45 CDC Ixis
c $27 $169 – –– –
46 Strong Capital Management $27 – – – – –
47 Eaton Vance Management  $26 $1 64.4% – – –
48 UniCredito Italiano (Pioneer Investment Mgmt) $26 $299 5.9% 7.0% 11.1% –
49 Nasdaq-Amex Investment Product Services
f $26 – – – – –
50 Trusco Capital Management $24 – – – – –
Panel a: Net Mutual Fund Assets from CRSP
a
Table 7: Largest U.S. Mutual Fund Companies as of 12/31/03
Panel b: Additional Information
b
c These top holders have multiple fund families.
b Source: Bloomberg L.P. Data are as of December 31, 
2003.  Data for unlisted firms is taken from their  Annual 
Reports.
d Total assets for these firms exclude separate account 
assets.
a Source: Top fund families and net mutual fund assets compiled from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Mutual Fund Database. Data as of 12/31/03. Data are 
for the U.S. fund families with assets over $5 billion, aggregated by top holding company. 
Total mutual fund assets may include institutional  assets.Table 8: Largest U.S. Private Wealth Managers as of 6/30/2003 
The following table was originally printed in Barron’s, September 15, 2003, Rich Advice by Aline Sullivan, pg, 23. This table is reproduced in its entirety with 
permission from Dow Jones, ©2004. 
 
2003 TOP WEALTH MANAGERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Ranked by private banking assets under management, based on individual clients with accounts of $1 million or more 
 
1. Merrill Lynch 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $630 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT: $1 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $2 million 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 1,888 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: N/A 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 610 
SPECIALTIES: Assets, tax and concentrated stock management, trusts 





2. Smith Barney 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $432 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT: N/A 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $1.7 billion 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 10,158*  
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 10-11 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 531 
SPECIALTIES: Estate planning, philanthropic services, tailored 
lending, trust, asset management, restricted-security management, 
alternative investments, family advisory, fine art advisory. 




*all managers, not just $1 million plus 
 
3. Fidelity Investments 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $295 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT: $500,000 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $1.5 million 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 128 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 200-400 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 91 
SPECIALTIES: Strategic, consultative wealth-management solutions, 





4. UBS Wealth Management U.S.A. 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $191.4 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT: $2 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 7,024 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: N/A 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 367 
SPECIALTIES: Portfolio management, estate and wealth-transfer 
planning, financial planning, art banking, single-stock risk management, 
alternative investments, lending, stock option planning, philanthropy, 






U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $160 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT: $1 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 3,503 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: N/A 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 486 
SPECIALTIES: Financial planning, investment management, personal 
trust, estate planning, settlement and administration, charitable services, 
insurance, credit and banking, retirement and benefits. 
TEL: 888-283-9633 or 800-627-8625 
EMAIL: N/A 
WEB: www.wachovia.com/wealth and www.wachoviasec.com 
 
6.  JPMorgan Private Bank 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS:  $147 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  N/A 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT:  $25 million 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 310 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 50 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 24 
SPECIALTIES: Integrated advice in investing, credit and cash 
management, trust and estate planning, wealth structuring. 
TEL:  212-464-0290, ask for John Straus 
EMAIL:  John.a.straus@jpmorgan.com 





7. Charles Schwab 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $130 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $500,000 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 200 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 200-300 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 360 
SPECIALTIES:  Portfolio construction, retirement planning, tax-
intelligent investing strategies, trust and estate planning, charitable 
giving.  




8. Private Bank at Bank of America 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS:  $128.6 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $3 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT:  N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS:  1,010 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER:  100 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 122  
SPECIALTIES:  Integrated advice and solutions in banking, credit, 
trust, wealth-transfer and investments. 
TEL:  800-863-9500 
EMAIL:  privatebankbusiness@bankofamerica.com 
WEB: www.bankofamerica.com/privatebank/  
 
9. The Northern Trust Company 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS:  $92.4 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $1 million for high net worth, $100 million 
for ultra-high net worth 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 228  
CLIENTS PER MANAGER:  95 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 84 






10. Morgan Stanley Private Wealth Management 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $80 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $10 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: N/A 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: N/A 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 8 






11. Wells Fargo Private Client Services 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $79.6 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $1 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 1,374 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 125 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 86 
SPECIALTIES: Wealth planning, affiliated and non-affiliated money 





12. Goldman Sachs Private Wealth Management 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $78 billion* 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $2 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 320 in the U.S.  
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: N/A 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 11 
SPECIALTIES: Portfolio management, alternative investments, single-
stock risk management, tax, trust and estate planning. 
TEL: 800-323-5678 x26970 
EMAIL: pwminfo@gs.com 
WEB: www.gs.com/pwm 








13. Citigroup Private Bank 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $65 billion* 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $5 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $10 million 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 130 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 30-50 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 20 
SPECIALTIES: Co-investment opportunities with Citigroup, 
alternative investments, capital markets products and execution, 
philanthropic advice, family advisory services, art advisory.  
EMAIL: N/A 
CONTACT: 212-559-6156, ask for Damian Kozlowski, Head of U.S. 
Region 
WEB: www.citibank.com/privatebank 
*approximate US proportion of $180 billion global total 
 
14. Mellon Financial 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $63 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $1 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 350 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 50-75 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 63 
SPECIALTIES: Asset allocation, alternative investments, fiduciary 






U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $56 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $5 million in investable assets 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 34 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 50-80 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 12 






16. U.S. Trust 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $52.0 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $2 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $7 million* 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 1,473 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: N/A 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 34 
SPECIALTIES: Investment management and consulting, fiduciary 
services, financial, tax and estate planning, and banking. 
TEL: 800-USTRUST 
EMAIL: Contact via corporate website 
WEB: www.ustrust.com 
*average account size 
 
17. Credit Suisse First Boston 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $49 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $1 billion 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $2.5 million 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 309 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 75 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 10  
SPECIALTIES: Solutions for the needs of wealthy individuals. 





18. Bank One Private Client Services 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $43.2 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $1 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 634 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 100 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 89  
SPECIALTIES: Financial advice, investment management, banking 
insurance, trust services to affluent individuals, families, and business 
owners. 








 19. PNC Advisors 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $42.2 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $1 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 323 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: N/A 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 40  
SPECIALTIES: Investment and consulting management; trust services; 





20. Fleet Private Clients Group 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $39.3 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $1 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $2.5 million for high net worth clients, $25 
million for family-office wealth management. 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 410 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 10 to 100 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 50 






21. U.S. Bank Private Client Group 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $34 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $500,000 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $1.9 million 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 400 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 90 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 122 
SPECIALTIES: Financial and estate planning, working with business 
owners, corporate executives, health-care professionals, legal 
professional, nonprofit organizations, personal philanthropy and 
professional athletes. 




22. Deutsche Bank Private Wealth Management 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $34 billion* 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $2 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 147 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: N/A 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 9 
SPECIALTIES: Highly personalized strategic wealth advisory. 
EMAIL: N/A 
WEB: www.pwm.db.com/us 
*includes Scudder Private Investment Counsel 
 
23. Bessemer Trust Company 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $32.1 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $10 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $20.1 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 34 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 42 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 10 
SPECIALTIES: Integrated wealth management, alternative 
investments (private equity, venture capital, hedge funds and real 
estate). 




24. The Bank of New York Private Client Services 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $30 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $1 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 74 portfolio managers with 
between 40 and 100 relationships per manager plus 264 private bankers, 
trust, custody and financial planning specialists. 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 40-100 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 15  
SPECIALTIES: Asset allocation, investment management, banking, 
trust, estate and financial planning.  




25. McDonald Financial Group 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $30 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  N/A 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 70 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: N/A 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 87 
SPECIALTIES: Banking, estate planning, financial planning, 
retirement planning, brokerage, trust, individual asset management, 








26. Neuberger Berman 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $24 billion  
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $500,000 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $3.7 million 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 64 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER:  N/A 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 14 
SPECIALTIES: Private asset management, tax and financial planning, 
personal and institutional trust services, alternative investments.  
TEL: 866-483-1063, ask for Heidi L. Steiger, Head of Private Asset 
Management 
EMAIL:  wealthmanagement@nb.com 
WEB: www.nb.com 
 
27. Wilmington Trust 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $23.1 billion  
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $1 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 55 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 301 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 16 
SPECIALTIES: Investment management, trustee services, banking, 
insurance services. 




28. National City 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $22 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $750,000 in assets or $300,000 in income 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 80 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 180 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 45 





29. State Street Global Advisors* 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $19.4 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $1.5 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $1 million 
TEL: 617-786-3000  
WEB:  www.saga.com 
*Based on data from 2002. The company did not respond to survey by press time.  
 
30. Harris Private Bank 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $16.5 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $1 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 200 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 15-200; 5-40 for $25 million-plus 
accounts 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 30 
SPECIALTIES: Investment management, personal trust services, 
banking, financial planning, family-office and philanthropy. 
TEL: 312-461-2052, ask for Bill Thonn, head of Harris Bank 
EMAIL: contactus@theharris.com 
 
31. William Blair & Company 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $13 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $250,000 for private investors, $2 million 
for investment management services 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 104 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: N/A 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 1 
SPECIALTIES: Investment management, financial planning, trust and 
estate planning.  
TEL: 312-364-8621, ask for Carlett McMullan; or 312-364-8129, ask 
for Michelle R. Seitz  
WEB: www.williamblair.com 
 
32. Brown Brothers Harriman 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $11.7 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $5 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $7.6 million 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 52 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 29 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 8 
SPECIALTIES: Tax-efficient asset management, asset allocation, risk 
management of concentrated holdings, alternative investments, treasury 





33. Fiduciary Trust 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $10.1 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $2 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $5.5 million 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS:  32 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 50 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 6 
SPECIALTIES: Global investment management, strategic planning for 
individuals and families, trustee, tax, banking and custody services. 
TEL: 212-632-3325, ask for Jim Goodfellow, Vice Chairmen, or 212-
632-3229, ask for Murray Stoltz, Senior Vice President 
EMAIL: mstoltz@ftci.com or jgoodfellow@ftci.com. 
WEB: www.ftci.com 
34. City National Corp. 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $9.9 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $1 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $1.5 million 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 99 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: N/A 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 15 
SPECIALTIES: Investment management, personal and business trust 
services, tax and estate planning, banking.  




35. Atlantic Trust Private Wealth Management 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $8.8 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $5 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $5 million 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 35  
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 20 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 10 





36. The Glenmede Trust Company 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $8.4 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $3 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $3.5 million 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 27  
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: N/A 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 5 
SPECIALTIES: Trust, estate, tax planning, financial planning, asset 





37. Boston Private Financial Holdings 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $6.8 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $2.0 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: $4.5 million 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 75 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 75 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 16 
SPECIALTIES: Banking, investment management, financial planning, 





38. Lowry Hill 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $5.3 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $10 million per family relationship 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 16 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 21 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 3 
SPECIALTIES: Large cap growth equities, small cap equities, 
international equities, municipal and government bonds, REITs, private 





39. Thomas Weisel Partners 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $5 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $2 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 12 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: 50 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 2 
SPECIALTIES: Asset-management consulting, restricted-stock 
transactions, alternative assets, private equity, specialty insurance.  




40. T. Rowe Price Asset Management 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT ASSETS: $3.7 billion 
MINIMUM ACCOUNT:  $2 million 
MEDIAN ACCOUNT: N/A 
PRIVATE CLIENT MANAGERS: 4 
CLIENTS PER MANAGER: N/A 
U.S. PRIVATE CLIENT OFFICES: 1  
SPECIALTIES: Customized tax-efficient investment management.  




Barron’s Survey of U.S. Wealth Managers excludes custodial and institutional funds. 
Assets are as of June 30, 2003.  




Cash Management x Providing short-term investment options such as sweep accounts.
Employee Benefit Plan Administration Provision of recordkeeping and administration for retirement and health plans.
Foreign Exchange x Foreign Exchange trading and research.
Fund Accounting x Multicurrency accounting & valuation services.
Fund Administration x Monitoring changes and preparing documentation for mutual funds.
Government Securities Clearing x Verification of transactions and settlement of government securities. 
Human Resource Outsourcing and 
Consulting
Solutions for human resource departments including benefit plan design and 
management, compensation structure design, and outsourcing HR functions.
Institutional Brokerage x Handling securities trades.
IT System Solutions x Developing and providing customer support for processing-related application 
software.
Outsourcing x Outsourcing of plan management and administration.  Outsourcing of securities 
processing and financial accounting.
Performance Analytics x Performance measurement and comparison, consulting, and VAR analysis.
Recordkeeping x Investor account maintenance, tax reporting, ownership records, and other 
paperwork associated with mutual and pension funds.
Risk Management & Compliance x Monitoring adherence to policy guidelines and pension plan risk management.
Securities Clearing x Processing of securities transactions for broker dealers.
Securities Lending x Lending securities as an intermediary.
Transfer Agency x Investor transaction processing.
Transition Management x Handling the process of buying and selling portfolios when clients transition from 
one asset manager to another.ADP $24.7 21.8% x x A
ALPS Mutual Funds Services – – x x x x C
Aon Corporation $27.0 16.6% x x D
Bear Stearns Securities $212.2 3.8% x x A,E
BISYS $1.7 48.5% x x x x A,C
Ceridian $5.2 24.5% x x D
Depository Trust & Clearing Corp
d –– x x D
DST Systems $3.2 21.4% x x A,C
EDS $18.3 31.3% x x A
Exult                                      $0.4 58.7% x x D
Fidelity Investments – – x x x A,B,E
Fiserv $7.2 30.5% x x A,E
Goldman Sachs $403.8 5.4% x x x x x x x x E
Hewitt Associates $1.7 45.2% x x x A,B
InCap Group – – x x x C
Jack Henry $0.5 74.2% x A
Marsh & McLennan  $15.1 36.2% x x x A,B,D
Meeder Financial – – x x x C
Merrill Lynch $494.5 6.1% x x x A,B,E
Nationwide Financial
fe $50.1 9.7% x B
Omgeo
f –– x D
Quantitative Investment Advisors – – x C
Prudential plc
e $252.9 2.4% x C
SEI Investments Inc $0.6 61.4% x x x x x A,C
SunGard Data Systems $4.0 69.1% x A
SWS Group $4.7 5.2% x x E
T. Rowe Price Associates $1.5 85.9% x A,B
Triad Securities – – x E
Ultimus Fund Solutions – – x x x C
Unified Financial Services – – x x x C
Vanguard Group – – x B
Watson Wyatt $0.5 35.9% x x D
Wedbush Morgan Securities – – x E
Western-Southern Financial Group $26.3 17.3% x x x C
Table Continued on Next Page

























































































































































































































































































eABN Amro $706.4 2.3% x x x x x E
Bank of America $736.4 6.5% x x x x x x x x E
Bank of New York $92.4 9.1% x x x x x x x x xxxxx C , E
Boston Financial Data Services
g – – x x x C,D
Brown Brothers Harriman $2.6 8.7% x x x x x x C
Citigroup $1,264.0 7.8% x x x x x x x x x x x C
CitiStreet
h –– x x B
Clearing House Payments Co.
i –– x x x D
Fifth Third $91 9.4% x x x x x x x x x D
ING $978.4 3.2% x x x x B
Investors Bank & Trust $9.2 5.9% x x x x x x x x x C
JPMorgan Chase $770.9 6.0% x x x x x x x x xxxxx C
Marshall & Ilsley (Metavante) $34.4 9.7% x x x x x A
Mellon Financial Corporation $34.0 10.9% x x x x x x x x x x x x x x B
Northern Trust $41.5 7.4% x x x x x x x x x x x x C
PNC Financial $68.2 10.4% x x x x x x x x x C
Royal Bank of Canada Fncl. Group $305.7 4.6% x x x x x x xxxxx x E
State Street $87.5 6.6% x x x x x x xxxxxxx C
UMB Financial Corporation $7.7 10.5% x x x x x x x C
US Bancorp $189.3 10.2% x x x x x x x C
Wachovia Corporation $401.0 8.7% x x x x x x xxxxxx E
































































A = listed in Hoovers as a nonbank processing competitor of one of the top four U.S. processing banks in the US (Bank of New York, State 
Street, Mellon Financial, Northern Trust) or as a processing competitor of the major nonbank processors (BISYS, First Data, SEI Investments).
a Processing bank competitors were compiled using the sources found in footnote c. The processing activities of these companies were 
expanded beyond those in the sources found in footnote c using information gathered from company reports and websites.





























































































d DTCC is owned by its principal users - major banks, broker / dealers, mutual funds firms and other companies within the financial services 
industry, including the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) and the New York Stock Exchange. 
b Source: Bloomberg L.P. Data are as of December 31, 2003.
g Joint venture of State Street and DST Systems.
h Joint venture of Citigroup and State Street.
C = listed as top providers in fund accounting and transfer agent services in the 2003 Mutual Fund Service Guide  published by Thomson.
D = mentioned in an interview we conducted.
E = Included in Investment News' "2003 Top U.S. Clearing Firms Ranked by Number of Clients" (Dec. 15, 2003) and providing clearing to 
100 or more clients.
f Joint venture of Thomson and the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation.

























































































































i Clearing House Payments Co. is jointly owned by several banks. Its subsidiaries include Clearing House Interbank Payments System 





Table 10 Continued:  Firms Engaged in U.S. Processing Activities as of 12/31/03
a 
(Bank-Affiliated Competitors)Table 11: Basel II Status of the 29 Largest Banking Companies
a
Mandatory Basel II Banks Undeclared
c
Citigroup $1,318 U.S. Bancorp $192
Bank of America $820 National City $111
JP Morgan Chase $801 BB&T $94
Wachovia $411 Fifth Third $94
Wells Fargo $397 Citizens Financial $80
Deutsche Bank $337 MBNA $61
Washington Mutual $248 AmSouth $47
State Street $93 Charles Schwab $46
Bank of New York $93 UnionBanCal $46
Regions Financial $45
Opting-In Banks Harris $41
BancWest $39
Mellon $34








b Total assets source: Bloomberg L.P.
c These companies did not rule out voluntary adoption of Basel II capital standards, but were either undecided or would not 






Reprinted with permission. Source: American Banker , "Takers and Tire Kickers: Where 29 of the Largest Banking 
Companies Stand on Participation in Basel II," July 24, 2004. 
a The non-mandatory banks are placed into the opting-in, probably opting-in, and undeclared categories according to 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 13: Capital Ratios for the U.S. Processing Banks
a
STATE STREET CORP 2Q02 3Q02 4Q02 1Q03 2Q03 3Q03 4Q03 1Q04 2Q04
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital (billions) $4.1 $4.2 $4.7 $4.3 $4.3 $4.4 $4.8 $5.0 $5.1
Total Risk-Based Capital (billions) $4.4 $4.4 $5.0 $4.5 $4.5 $5.0 $5.4 $5.6 $5.7
Risk-Weighted Assets (billions) $27.1 $24.9 $27.6 $24.9 $28.9 $34.0 $34.5 $35.7 $35.8
Total Assets (billions) $79.3 $77.6 $85.8 $79.1 $83.1 $81.8 $87.5 $92.9 $94.1
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 5.3% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.2% 5.5% 5.6% 5.5% 5.5%
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio 15.1% 16.8% 17.1% 17.1% 14.7% 12.9% 14.0% 13.9% 14.2%
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio 16.1% 17.8% 18.0% 18.1% 15.6% 14.7% 15.8% 15.6% 15.8%
BANK OF NY CO 2Q02 3Q02 4Q02 1Q03 2Q03 3Q03 4Q03 1Q04 2Q04
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital (billions) $5.3 $5.2 $5.0 $5.2 $5.1 $5.2 $5.4 $5.6 $5.8
Total Risk-Based Capital (billions) $7.8 $7.9 $7.9 $8.3 $8.3 $8.3 $8.3 $8.6 $8.7
Risk-Weighted Assets (billions) $68.5 $67.0 $66.3 $65.4 $74.4 $74.0 $72.1 $73.1 $74.8
Total Assets (billions) $81.1 $81.1 $77.6 $79.6 $99.6 $95.3 $92.4 $92.7 $97.6
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 6.8% 6.8% 6.5% 6.7% 5.9% 5.6% 5.8% 5.8% 6.0%
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio 7.7% 7.7% 7.6% 7.9% 6.8% 7.1% 7.4% 7.6% 7.7%
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio 11.5% 11.7% 12.0% 12.7% 11.1% 11.2% 11.5% 11.7% 11.6%
MELLON FINANCIAL CORP 2Q02 3Q02 4Q02 1Q03 2Q03 3Q03 4Q03 1Q04 2Q04
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital (billions) $2.1 $2.1 $2.1 $2.2 $2.3 $2.4 $2.4 $2.5 $2.5
Total Risk-Based Capital (billions) $3.4 $3.3 $3.3 $3.5 $3.6 $3.8 $3.7 $3.9 $4.0
Risk-Weighted Assets (billions) $27.1 $26.7 $26.5 $25.5 $29.3 $26.8 $27.7 $28.4 $27.1
Total Assets (billions) $34.2 $35.3 $36.3 $35.6 $39.1 $33.0 $34.0 $34.0 $35.2
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 6.7% 6.5% 6.6% 6.7% 7.2% 7.7% 7.9% 8.1% 8.2%
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio 7.7% 7.8% 7.9% 8.6% 7.9% 8.9% 8.6% 8.7% 9.3%
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio 12.7% 12.3% 12.5% 13.6% 12.4% 14.0% 13.5% 13.7% 14.6%
NORTHERN TRUST CORP 2Q02 3Q02 4Q02 1Q03 2Q03 3Q03 4Q03 1Q04 2Q04
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital (billions) $2.9 $3.0 $3.0 $2.9 $3.0 $3.0 $3.1 $3.2 $3.2
Total Risk-Based Capital (billions) $3.8 $3.8 $3.8 $4.0 $3.8 $3.8 $3.9 $4.0 $4.0
Risk-Weighted Assets (billions) $27.3 $27.3 $27.2 $26.5 $27.1 $28.0 $27.9 $28.1 $28.9
Total Assets (billions) $37.8 $39.7 $39.5 $36.4 $39.1 $40.7 $41.5 $40.2 $43.3
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 8.0% 8.2% 7.8% 7.9% 7.8% 7.8% 7.6% 8.0% 7.9%
Tier 1 Risk-Based Capital Ratio 10.8% 10.9% 11.1% 11.1% 11.0% 10.8% 11.0% 11.2% 11.1%
Total Risk-Based Capital Ratio 13.9% 13.9% 14.1% 14.9% 14.2% 13.8% 14.0% 14.1% 13.9%
a Source:  Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FR Y-9C).